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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (“UNHCR”)—the UN agency tasked with protecting and 
assisting refugees around the world, global forced displacement 
increased in 2015 with record-high numbers.1 Currently, there are 
65.3 million individuals forcibly displaced worldwide—of which 12.4 
million are newly displaced—as a result of persecution, conflict, 
generalized violence, and human rights violations.2 The current 
number of displaced persons is the equivalent of the population of the 
twenty-first largest country in world—larger than the entire 
population of the United Kingdom.3 This total reflects 5.8 million 
more total displaced than in 2014, and the numbers are continuing to 
                                                                                                             
1. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS FORCED 
DISPLACEMENT IN 2015 2 (June 20, 2016), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
576408cd7.pdf. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
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climb.4 In fact, right now twenty-four new people are being displaced 
every minute.5 
Of the 65.3 million displaced worldwide: 
 21,300,000 are refugees who had to flee their own country; 
o 16,100,000 of which fall under UNHRC’s mandate 
o 5,200,000 of which are Palestinian refugees registered 
under a separate mandate through  the UN Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(“UNRWA”) 
 40,800,000 are persons internally displaced within their own 
country; and 
 3,200,000 are asylum seekers.6 
 
About fifty percent of the world’s refugees can be found in Asia and 
some twenty-eight percent can be found in Africa.7 It is left up to the 
developing countries of the world to play host to most refugees—with 
eighty-six percent of all refugees living in developing regions.8  
In general, refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced 
people face a number of human rights violations, including, but not 
limited to: 
 restrictions on right to liberty of movement 
 restrictions on right to liberty and security of person 
 arbitrary arrest and/or detention 
 restrictions on right, once deprived of liberty, to be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human person 
 restrictions on freedom to choose one’s residence 
 restrictions on right to work 
 restrictions on right to an adequate standard of living for 
oneself and one’s family, including adequate food, 
clothing, and housing, and to the continuous improvement 
of living conditions 
 restrictions on right to access health care 
 restrictions on right to education 
                                                                                                             
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 3. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 2. 
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 sexual and gender based violence 
 forced labor 
 trafficking 
 recruitment of child soldiers 
 torture and/or cruel or degrading treatment 
 
Thailand is a host to a significant number of refugees. In its role 
as host, Thailand also provides some protection against refugee 
expulsion/return and allows persons fleeing conflict or other incidents 
of violence in neighboring countries to cross over the border into 
Thailand and remain until conflict ceases.9 The main population of 
concern in this report is Burmese refugees of mostly ethnic Kayin 
(formerly Karen) and Kayah (formerly Karenni) origin who are 
enduring one of the most protracted refugee situations in the world.10 
Many arrived in temporary shelters on the Thai-Burma11 border as 
early as 1984.12 Other populations of concern in Thailand, outside the 
scope of this report, include urban refugees and asylum seekers from 
more than thirty different nationalities, mainly residing in Bangkok.13 
Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 Protocol. Nevertheless, Thailand 
is bound by the many obligations attached to the several international 
human rights treaties to which it is a State party. With few exceptions, 
these human rights protections to which Thailand must adhere apply 
to everyone in its jurisdiction—including refugees. 
                                                                                                             
9. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Thailand 2014 Human 
Rights Report 29 (2014). 
10. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 2014-2015 GLOBAL APPEAL: 
THAILAND 1 (2015), available at http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/fundraising/
528a0a330/unhcr-global-appeal-2014-2015-thailand.html. Others are of Bamar, Shan, and 
Mon descent.  
11. This report uses the term Thai-Burma border to refer to the border between Thailand 
and Myanmar, as this is how the border is referred to by the refugees, NGOs, and officilas 
whom we interviewed. [Burma was renamed Myanmar in 1989 by the military junta then in 
control of the government.] This report uses the term Myanmar to refer to the government or 
state of Myanmar generally, but uses the term Burma when referring to an occurrence that 
specially took place prior to 1989. Quoted interviewees may refer to either Burma or Myanmar 
interchangeably. Finally, this report uses the term Burmese to refer to any of the peoples of 
Burma, regardless of ethnic group.  
12. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, 2014-2015 GLOBAL APPEAL, 
supra note 10, at 1. 
13. Id. 
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Thailand’s domestic law does not provide for the granting of 
asylum or refugee status.14 Burmese refugees living outside official 
refugee camps are by law considered illegal migrants.15 If arrested, 
they are subject to indefinite detention at Immigration Detention 
Centers (“IDCs”) and/or deportation.16 As this report describes, the 
human rights of the approximately 110,000 Burmese refugees living 
in the nine refugee camps along the border with Myanmar are 
routinely violated. In the past two years in these camps, greater 
enforcement of restrictions on freedom of movement and the right to 
work, combined with decreases in resources and services—including 
access to adequate food, shelter, health care, and educational 
services—have created conditions which threaten to coercively return 
these refugees to Myanmar. Repatriation in this manner is not truly 
voluntary, but is instead a form of constructively forced return. Due to 
the conditions that currently exist in Myanmar, many of these coerced 
returns would also constitute a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement, in clear contravention of Thailand’s treaty obligations 
and accepted norms of customary international law. 
This Report represents the culmination of a two-year 
interdisciplinary project undertaken by the Leitner Center for 
International Law and Justice at Fordham Law School. A delegation 
from Fordham visited Thailand and Myanmar in May 2015 to conduct 
research and interviews. The Fordham delegation was led by the 
2014–15 Crowley Fellow in International Human Rights, Zach 
Hudson. The delegation included Fordham Law School Professor 
James Kainen, Leitner Center Executive Director Elisabeth Wickeri, 
Leitner Center Program Assistant Elizabeth Gyori, and eight second-
year law students: Rodrigo Bacus, Krista Hahn Bloomenberg, 
Thomas Callahan, Hailey Flynn, Stella Gilliland, Olivia Gonzalez, 
Christina Menga, and Celidon Pitt. Members of the Fordham 
delegation also traveled to Geneva in March 2016 to carry out follow-
up research, and to conduct advocacy and present findings through 
the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (“UPR”) 
process for Thailand. 
                                                                                                             
14. See Immigration Act, B.E. 2522 (Thai.); Nationality Act, B.E. 2535 (Thai.) 
15. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, AD HOC AND INADEQUATE 4 (2012), available at 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/thailand0912.pdf [hereinafter AD HOC AND 
INADEQUATE]. 
16. Id. 
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Prior to conducting fieldwork in Thailand and Myanmar, the 
delegation participated in an intense program of study throughout the 
academic year, including a seminar led by Mr. Hudson and Ms. 
Wickeri that focused on the intersection of refugee protection issues 
and human rights in Thailand. During the visit to Thailand and 
Myanmar, the delegation conducted interviews with individuals in 
refugee camps, refugee committees, non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”), lawyers, academics, donor agencies, members of the 
government, and the United Nations. Members of the Crowley 
delegation traveled to three different areas along the Thai-Burma 
border encompassing the nine refugee camps housing Burmese 
refugees, in addition to traveling to both Bangkok and Yangon. 
This Report presents the findings of this research effort. Part II 
describes the conditions in which Burmese refugees living in 
Thailand find themselves—and the conditions in Myanmar that serve 
as both the cause of their refugee status and the obstacle to their 
return. Part III sets out the international human rights legal framework 
governing refugee protection issues and provides an analysis of the 
conditions in which Burmese refugees find themselves through the 
lens of these international human rights legal frameworks. The Report 
then concludes with a series of recommendations aimed at ensuring 
that the human rights of Burmese refugees living in Thailand are 
protected—and that violations of their rights do not lead to 
constructive refoulement to a place where their lives or liberty would 
be threatened. 
II. STATUS OF BURMESE REFUGEES LIVING IN THAILAND 
a. Overview of General Conditions for Refugees Living in Thailand 
For decades, Thailand has been a “reluctant host” to large 
numbers of refugees fleeing persecution in neighboring countries.17 
Following the establishment of camps for Cambodian, Lao, and 
Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s,18 the first camps for Burmese 
refugees were established along the Thai-Burma border in 1984.19 
                                                                                                             
17. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 18 n.12. 
18. See Hazel Lang, The repatriation predicament of Burmese Refugees in Thailand: a 
preliminary analysis 2 (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 46, 2001). The last of the non-
Burmese camps was closed in 2009. See id.  
19. Lang, supra note 18, at 1; see also AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 15. 
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While the numbers of camps and refugees have fluctuated over the 
last thirty years,20 today the Thai government recognizes nine 
Burmese refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border.21 There is also 
a tenth camp—Kuang Jor—housing ethnic Shan from Myanmar.22 
The refugees living in Kuang Jor receive humanitarian aid, but the 
camp is not formally recognized by either the Thai government or 
UNHCR.23 
As of December 2016, UNHCR and the Thai Ministry of Interior 
confirmed that there are a total of 102,607 Burmese refugees now 
living in the nine camps.24 At the time this project began, there were 
110,637 camp residents.25 With some fluctuation, the general trend 
over the past six years has been a steady decrease in camp 
populations.26 In addition to the refugees living in the camps, there are 
an estimated one to three million Burmese living in Thailand outside 
the camps.27 
The camps along the border are the only recognized asylum 
spaces for Burmese refugees in Thailand—those living outside the 
camps are generally considered “illegal” and, if caught, face 
deportation.28 Thai officials have openly declared the government’s 
                                                                                                             
20. See Adam Saltsman, Beyond the Law: Power, Discretion, and Bureaucracy in the 
Mgmt. of Asylum Space in Thailand, 27 J. REFUGEE STUD. 457, 462 (2014) (noting that in the 
1980s, there were thirty open, informal, village-like Burmese refugee camps in Thailand, 
which lasted until 1984 when cross-border attacks by the Burmese Army prompted the Thai 
government to consolidate and regulate the camps). 
21. See, e.g., BORDER CONSORTIUM, PROGRAMME REPORT JULY - DECEMBER 2014 
(2014), available at http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/57485/2014-6-Mth-Rpt-Jul-
Dec.pdf [hereinafter TBC PROGRAM REP.]. The nine camps are (from north to south): Ban Mai 
Nai Soi, Mae Surin, Mae La Oon, Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La, Umpiem Mai, Nu Po, Ban Don 
Yang, and Tham Hin. See generally U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES THAILAND, 
https://www.unhcr.or.th/en (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
22. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 18 n.12. 
23. Id. 
24. Refugee and IDP Camp Populations: December 2016, BORDER CONSORTIUM 
(2016), http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/76787/2016-12-dec-map-tbc-unhcr.pdf.  
25. Refugee and IDP Camp Populations: February 2015, BORDER CONSORTIUM 
(2015), http://www.theborderconsortium.org/media/58064/2015-02-feb-map-tbc-unhcr.pdf. 
This figure is calculated by The Border Consortium (“TBC”) and includes all persons 
confirmed to be living in the camps and eligible for rations, registered or not. Id. This total also 
includes the approximately 513 Shan refugees living in Kuang Jor camp.  
26. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 3. From 2005-2012, the total camp 
population held fairly steady at around 140,000. Id. at 5.  
27. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 15. This figure includes both 
refugees and economic migrants, as well as individuals who may self-identify as economic 
migrants but who may fit the refugee definition as well.  
28. See Saltsman, supra note 20, at 461. 
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desire to close the camps and return the refugees to Myanmar for at 
least the last fifteen years,29 but as of yet there have been no mass 
repatriations. Nevertheless, recent ceasefires between the Burmese 
army and armed rebel groups in Myanmar and recent agreements 
between the governments of the two countries have sparked fears that 
forced repatriations may be forthcoming.30 
1. Refugee Management in Thailand 
A. Government 
A myriad of Thai authorities and other actors are responsible for 
refugee management in and outside of the refugee camps. Thailand is 
a constitutional monarchy, with the King as the head of state.31 Under 
the King, refugee management is primarily undertaken at the national 
level by the Ministry of Interior (“MOI”) and the Ministry of Defense 
(“MOD”) through the Royal Thai Army.32 As of 2013, the MOI and 
the Army affected management through five different security 
forces.33 Despite the official government role in regulating various 
aspects of refugee life, there is no government structure for the 
provision of humanitarian aid or refugee protection.34 
The MOI is the ultimate authority over the nine recognized 
camps.35 As such, the Ministry executes the policies set forth by the 
national government through its provincial and district authorities.36 
The top provincial authority appointed by the MOI is the district 
commander, or nai amphur.37 The nai amphur is in charge of the 
                                                                                                             
29. See Lang, supra note 18, at 2. 
30. See, e.g., Thin Lei Win, Thai military conducts refugee headcount, sparking fears of 
forced repatriation, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND. (July 21, 2014, 9:41 AM), 
http://www.trust.org/item/20140721092847-kd7i3/. 
31. See Rattha Thammanun Haeng Ratcha Anachak [CONSTITUTION] July 22, 2014, § 2 
(Thai.). 
32. See Saltsman, supra note 20, at 462. 
33. Id. It is unclear what changes, if any, have occurred with regards to the national legal 
framework for refugee management following the May 2014 coup. 
34. Id. 
35. See JULIE FRECCERO & KIM THUY SEELINGER, SAFE HAVEN: SHELTERING 
DISPLACED PERSONS FROM SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED-VIOLENCE-CASE STUDY: 
THAILAND 30 (2013), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/51dc189d4.html. 
36. Id. 
37. This is may also spelled “nai ampur”. See KIRSTEN MCCONNACHIE, GOVERNING 
REFUGEES: JUSTICE, ORDER, AND LEGAL PLURALISM 80 (2014); see also AD HOC AND 
INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 42. 
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general administration of each district.38 The MOI also appoints a 
camp commander (palad) and employs the Voluntary Defense Corps 
(Or Sor) for each camp.39 The palad and Or Sor are responsible for 
regulating the camps, including perimeter security, headcounts, and 
camp entry and exit.40 Or Sor members are generally poorly trained 
and underpaid and are recruited from local communities.41 The Or Sor 
unit in Mae La camp is particularly “notorious for corrupt and abusive 
practices.”42 
In the context of refugee management, the Royal Thai Army is 
chiefly responsible for Thai-Burma border security.43 Together with 
its paramilitary proxy force, the Tahan Phran rangers, and the 
paramilitary Border Patrol police, the Army undertakes management 
of cross-border affairs and counter-narcotics work.44 The Army is also 
involved in regulating and counting camp populations,45 and 
sometimes completes initial assessments of arriving refugees as they 
cross the border.46 Thai immigration police and the regular Thai 
police force also play a role in refugee management,47 particularly 
outside the camps. These authorities are tasked with enforcing 
Thailand’s Immigration Law by identifying and arresting 
undocumented foreigners through checkpoints, raids, and street 
searches.48 
B. Refugee Committees 
Although the MOI has ultimate authority over the camps, day-to-
day operations are overseen by refugee committees, camp 
                                                                                                             
38. CLARK D. NEHER, MODERN THAI POLITICS: FROM VILLAGE TO NATION 189 (1981). 
Each of Thailand’s provinces is subdivided into districts, of which the nai amphur is 
commander. See also JOHN WILLIAM HENDERSON, ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR THAILAND 
183 (3d ed. 1971). It has been difficult to find any up-to-date information about the nai 
amphurs’ role or specific information on the nai amphurs’ activities relating to refugee 
management. 
39. MCCONNACHIE, supra note 37, at 30. 
40. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 42; see also id. 
41. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 42. 
42. Id. 
43. Id.; see also INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, THAILAND MIGRATION REPORT 2011 120 
(Jerrold W. Huguet & Aphichat Chamratrithirong eds., 2011) [hereinafter IOM REPORT 2011]. 
44. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 42; see also IOM REPORT 2011, supra 
note 43, at 120. 
45. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 25. 
46. See id.  
47. See id. at 42. 
48. See id. at 6. 
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committees, and community-based organizations.49 The refugee 
committees are supra-camp bodies that coordinate with camp 
committees and liaise with the Thai government, UNHCR, donors, 
and NGOs.50 The Karen Refugee Committee (“KRC”) manages the 
seven Karen-majority camps, and the Karenni Refugee Committee 
(“KnRC”) organizes between the two predominantly Karenni 
camps.51 There is also a refugee committee for Shan refugees.52 In the 
past, there has been evidence that the KRC and KnRC had ties to the 
armed ethnic groups fighting the Burmese army in Myanmar.53 It is 
not clear how, if at all, the recent ceasefire agreements between the 
armed groups and the Burmese army have affected these ties. 
The refugee committees do not work directly in the camps.54 
Rather, they operate through camp committees,55 which oversee daily 
management and operations, camp justice systems, and refugee 
security.56 Camp committees have also established subcommittees to 
manage health activities, education, camp affairs, and supply 
provisions.57 The committees also play a major role in controlling 
distribution of rations and building materials.58 Committees are drawn 
from the refugee populations through a selection process that involves 
at least an initial round of voting by the camp residents.59 
Food, shelter materials, services, and other aid are provided by 
NGOs, many of which are represented by The Border Consortium 
(“TBC”).60 The Thai government does not provide humanitarian 
support for the camps, so TBC and other NGO providers are heavily 
                                                                                                             
49. See IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 120. 
50. Id. at 120-21; see also SUSAN BANKI & HAZEL LANG, PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE: 
THE IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT ON THE REMAINING CAMP POPULATION 21 (2007). 
51. FRECCERO & SEELINGER, supra note 35, at 30-31. Across all nine recognized camps, 
approximately seventy-nine percent of refugees are Karen, ten percent are Karenni, and the 
remainder is a mixture of other ethnic groups.  
52. IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 120. 
53. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 48-49. 
54. See BANKI & LANG, supra note 50, at 21. 
55. See IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 120-21. 
56.  FRECCERO & SEELINGER, supra note 35, at 30-31. 
57. See IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 121. 
58. See AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 28 (discussing the level of power 
committees hold over food distribution lists). 
59. IOM REPORT 2011, supra note 43, at 121. At the time of this report, all camp 
residents over age twenty were eligible to vote. 
60. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 25. 
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dependent on donations from international donors in order to meet the 
needs of camp residents.61 
C. UNHCR 
UNHCR is an international organization “dedicated to saving 
lives, protecting rights and building a better future for refugees, 
forcibly displaced communities and stateless people.”62 UNHCR has 
had a presence on the Thai-Burma border since 1998, when it 
negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the Thai 
government63; however, Thai authorities have never allowed the 
agency to have a role in the operation of the camps.64 UNHCR is not 
permitted to provide assistance to the camps or to register refugees 
living there,65 and it may only access the camps through the provision 
of a pass granted by permission of district-level MOI officials.66 
Limits to UNHCR’s role are not restricted to the camps. 
UNHCR has not been permitted to conduct refugee status 
determinations for Burmese refugees outside the camps since 2004, 
following the government’s mandate that all Burmese refugees should 
live in the camps.67 The agency may only access IDCs on a 
“conditional” basis, meaning that it must submit an official request 
for permission to visit, and it may not conduct status determinations 
or registrations during the visit.68 
For non-Burmese, non-Lao, and non-North Korean asylum 
seekers, UNHCR conducts refugee status determinations and issues 
“Asylum Seeker Certificates” to those it determines qualify as 
refugees.69 However, these certificates provide no employment 
authorization and have no legal weight if the holder is stopped by 
police.70 UNHCR provides refugees (including Burmese refugees 
                                                                                                             
61. See generally id. 
62. About Us, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Apr. 
13, 2015). 
63. Sally Thompson, Community-based Camp Management, 30 FORCED MIGRATION 
REV. 26, 26 (2008). The Memorandum of Understanding gave UNHCR a mandate for 
monitoring and protection of refugees on the Thai-Burma border. See id. 
64. AD HOC AND INADEQUATE, supra note 15, at 19. 
65. See id. at 88. 
66. See id. at 19. 
67. Id. at 1. UNHCR is also barred from performing refugee status determinations for 
Lao Hmong or North Korean refugees in Thailand. 
68. See id. at 88. 
69. Id. at 87. 
70. See id. 
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outside the camps) with emergency phone numbers to call in case of 
arrest, though refugees and asylum seekers report that their calls often 
go unanswered.71 
2. Treatment of Refugees in Thailand 
Under national law, asylum seekers and refugees in Thailand are 
treated as illegal migrants.72 Burmese refugees are legally allowed to 
remain in the country as long as they stay within one of the nine 
camps, which Thailand maintains as “temporary shelters” for 
“displaced persons fleeing fighting” until the conditions in Myanmar 
allow for return.73 This legal treatment underlies the government’s 
general policy that the country is “unwilling to remain an indefinite 
host” to the Burmese refugees currently residing within its borders, 
and that the sooner the refugees can return home, the better.74 
The treatment of refugees generally in Thailand is reflective of a 
popular perception that the refugees pose national security, economic, 
and cultural threats to Thai society.75 This perception is heavily 
influenced by Thai political rhetoric and media reports,76 and 
translates to a treatment of refugees that varies significantly between 
different refugee populations based upon ethnicity, location within 
Thailand, and country or province of origin. The government’s 
negative attitude toward refugees carries over to Thai society, where 
there tends to be an entrenched prejudice against immigrants and 
refugees, particularly among Burmese populations.77 Burmese 
migrants are commonly seen as criminals, carriers of disease, and as a 
drain on the economy.78 These perceptions are often reinforced by 
political rhetoric and media reports that frequently highlight any 
crimes committed by Burmese migrants.79 In 2006, UNHCR reported 
that a rise in threats, harassment, and violence against refugees in 
urban centers had been fueled in part by media reports that refugees 
                                                                                                             
71. Id. at 7. 
72. Lang, supra note 18, at 3. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 2. 
75. Inge Brees, Burden or Boon: The Impact of Burmese Refugees on Thailand, 11 
WHITEHEAD J. OF DIPL. & INT’L REL. 1, 37 (2010).  
76. See id. 
77. Saltsman, supra note 20, at 461. 
78. Id. 
79. See Brees, supra note 75, at 37. 
342 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
spread disease.80 Media reports that perpetuate the idea that Thailand 
is being overrun by foreigners81 feed into fears that a change in 
Thailand’s demographics will lead to a loss of Thai culture.82 
The treatment of refugees in Thailand may differ depending on a 
variety of factors. An individual who identifies as an economic 
migrant, for example, is generally treated differently from an 
individual who identifies as a refugee. Individuals labeled as 
“refugees” are not permitted to work in Thailand,83 while individuals 
labeled as “economic migrants” are not eligible for refugee protection 
or resettlement.84 This is the case even though a self-identified 
economic migrant may have experienced persecution (for example, 
by being forced into labor by the Burmese army or held as a political 
prisoner) that would qualify him or her as a de facto refugee.85 An 
individual’s “refugee” or “economic migrant” designation, thus, has a 
significant impact on how he or she is treated under Thai law and 
policies. 
Refugees from certain ethnic groups also experience different 
treatment, both as a consequence of Thai law and policies and, 
unofficially, by camp committees. Perhaps most notably, ethnic Shan 
from Myanmar are categorically prohibited from registering as 
refugees in Thailand on the grounds that, given their linguistic 
similarity to the Thai, they are able to integrate into the Thai 
workforce more easily than other Burmese.86 In another example, 
Rohingya refugees are generally not able to access refugee 
protections,87 nor are they able to legalize their status in Thailand as 
migrant workers.88 
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In addition to these official differences in treatment, there have 
been reports of differential treatment of ethnic groups by camp 
committees. As discussed above, seven of the camps are 
predominantly Karen, and two are mostly Karenni. The committees in 
these camps sometimes have their own arrival assessment process: if 
the committee decides that a new arrival doesn’t meet its “refugee” 
criteria, the committee may allow the individual to enter, but it may 
deny building materials or rations, such that the individual is 
essentially forced to leave and try to live elsewhere.89 A camp 
committee leader from one Karen-majority camp indicated an 
assumption that only Karen were legitimate asylum seekers, and that 
all other groups were simply economic migrants.90 Ethnic minority 
groups have reported prejudicial determinations by the committees as 
well as a general sense of being unwelcome in the camps.91 
3. Thai Domestic Legal Framework Applicable to Refugees 
The legal landscape in Thailand, as it relates to immigration, 
relies primarily on two statutory sources and the 2014 interim 
Constitution.92 These statutory sources include the Immigration Act, 
which controls the legal framework for Thai immigration, and the 
Nationality Act, which defines what it means to be a Thai national.93 
 
A. Thailand’s Constitutional Framework 
In the summer of 2014, Thailand’s most recent military junta, 
the National Council for Peace and Order (“NCPO”), established its 
power legislatively by drafting the 2014 interim Constitution.94 This 
resulted from the latest in a long line of military coups that began in 
1932 as Thailand transitioned from an absolute monarchy to a 
constitutional democracy.95 Thailand’s constitutional history was 
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shaped by these changes in power between factions. The coup in 1932 
began a cycle of new factions legitimizing their power by suspending 
existing Constitutions and establishing new ones.96 For instance, 
during the era following World War II (amidst the creation of 
international law), Thailand experienced an era of legal and 
governmental uncertainty following the assassination of King Ananda 
in 1946.97 Here again, a military coup filled the power vacuum in 
Thailand until a new Constitution was promulgated in 1978.98 
The coup that produced the 2014 interim Constitution was 
brought about by the climax of tensions between the “Red Shirts” and 
the “Yellow Shirts,” two opposed political movements in Thailand.99 
The Red Shirts were populists who supported policies favoring rural 
villagers in Thailand’s north, while the Yellow Shirts represented 
Bangkok’s middle class urban elite.100 Their tensions revolved around 
the removal of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a divisive populist 
figure whose sister Yingluck Shinawatra later took power in 2011.101 
In 2013, she proposed legislation that would have granted legal 
immunity to Thaksin Shinawatra and his affiliates.102 This triggered a 
wave of violence between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, 
where the Yellow Shirts wanted to end the involvement of the 
Shinawatra family in politics.103 In 2014, Yingluck Shinawatra was 
removed from office by the Thai Constitutional Court, further 
angering the Red Shirts.104 This brought about a peak in violence 
between the two groups that ultimately motivated the military to 
intervene.105 The military began running the country in May 2014, 
after six months of political crisis.106 The 2014 interim Constitution, 
problematic as it may be, was drafted in large part in response to the 
problems of political corruption that motivated the coup in the first 
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place; however, it was always meant as a temporary framework.107 
Yet despite the junta leading several rounds attempting to broker a 
new permanent constitution, as of the date of publication, the 2014 
interim Constitution has not been superseded and still remains the 
supreme law of Thailand.108  
B. Thai Government Structure 
Thai government structure is considered to be a constitutional 
monarchy, meaning that the King is head of state, but the lawmaking 
power resides with an elected parliament.109 At the time of the 2014 
coup, the King of Thailand, Bhumibol Adulyadej, who passed away 
in October 2016, had been in power for nearly sixty-eight years and 
was the longest reigning monarch in the world.110 King Bhumibol 
Adulyadej had been a constant figure during Thailand’s many past 
coups.111 In fact, the only provision from the 2007 Constitution that 
carried over into the subsequent 2014 Constitution was Section 2, 
which establishes the monarchy and the King as head of state.112 
Otherwise, the 2014 interim Constitution repealed the preceding 2007 
Constitution almost in its entirety.113 Thai reverence for the King is 
also embedded in the Thai Criminal Code, which contains lèse 
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majesté laws that criminalize any critique of the King.114 Despite the 
King’s prominence in Thai society, the 2014 interim Constitution 
allocates the majority of the administrative power to the military 
junta.115 
There are four main branches of the Thai government, all of 
which are controlled by the military government (“NCPO”): the 
National Reform Council, the Constitution Drafting Committee, the 
National Legislative Assembly, and the Constitutional Court.116 The 
National Reform Council is charged with carrying out political 
reforms in Thailand after the 2014 coup.117 This includes devising 
national policies on economics, education, and public administration 
generally.118 The members of the National Reform Council are 
handpicked as representatives by the NCPO and they each represent 
their respective provinces.119 While technically, the members of the 
National Legislative Assembly are appointed by the King, the 
possible appointees are selected by the NCPO.120 Likewise, the 
members of the Constitution Drafting Committee are also handpicked 
by the NCPO, and then appointed by the National Reform Council—
which is itself comprised of a member pool selected exclusively by 
the NCPO.121 The National Legislative Assembly is a unicameral 
legislature composed of 220 appointees who are in charge of writing 
bills.122 However, the King retains the power to veto any bill, 
according to section fifteen of the 2014 interim Constitution.123 While 
the King plays a political role in the governance process, the military 
junta is responsible for choosing the people who fill these government 
positions.124 Taken together, these structural elements concentrate 
power in the hands of the military junta. This governmental structure 
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is one of the reasons why Thailand is unable to ensure the protection 
of rights in conformity with international standards. 
The NCPO has the constitutional authority to curtail the 
protection of human rights as it sees fit absent of subjection to any 
judicial review.125 Furthermore, the governmental structure laid out 
above impedes access to justice in Thailand because it establishes the 
military junta’s stronghold over the legal system. The 2014 
Constitution gives immunity to NCPO members, meaning that since 
they cannot be prosecuted for human rights abuses of any kind under 
Section 48 of the 2014 Constitution, the NCPO and its affiliates are 
immune from being held liable for any wrongdoing.126 This provision 
applies to their actions before and after the passage of the 2014 
Constitution.127 
C. Thai Immigration Law 
Thai immigration law is controlled by the Thai Immigration Act, 
which regulates who may enter, exit, and reside in Thailand.128 The 
Immigration Act defines an “alien” as “anyone who is not of Thai 
nationality.”129 The Nationality Act defines anyone born to Thai 
parents (jus sanguinis) or born on Thai soil (jus solis) as having “Thai 
nationality.”130 The Ministry of the Interior is the Thai authority 
responsible for regulating immigration flow.131 The Immigration 
Commission is the governmental body responsible for the approval of 
any petitions to enter or exit the country.132 Under Section 16 of the 
Immigration Act, the Ministry can decide to deny entry to anyone for 
a cause they determine to be appropriate.133 Section 16 cites reasons 
like “national welfare or safeguarding the public peace, culture, 
morality, or welfare,” but ultimately it is legal for an alien to be 
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denied entry “when the Minister considers it improper to allow any 
alien or any group of aliens to enter into the Kingdom.”134 
In addition to these bureaucratic barriers to entry, the Ministry 
also imposes financial barriers.135 The Ministry places significant 
economic burdens on all aliens seeking permission to live or work in 
Thailand. Applicants are required to pay fees when reapplying for 
temporary status,136 when petitioning for reentry,137 and when they are 
detained or deported.138 Additionally, the cost of detention is paid for 
entirely by the detainee, according to Section 54 of the Immigration 
Act.139 
While the Immigration Act grants the Ministry the ability to 
detain violators of immigration law, it makes no mention of how 
Thailand will handle refugees.140 Broadly speaking, Thailand has no 
formal refugee law or asylum seeking process at all.141 As a result, the 
Ministry can use its discretion to handle immigration detention, 
refugee flow, and refugee camp administration.142 Before refugees are 
even classified, counted, and moved into camps, they must proceed 
through parts of the Thai immigration bureaucracy described above. 
This sometimes results in the arbitrary detention of those who could 
potentially acquire refugee status.143 
4. Myanmar: Conditions in Country of Origin  
Myanmar is the country from where these refugees in question 
originated, and the country to which they could presumably be 
returned by Thai authorities; because of this, conditions in Myanmar 
can be an important consideration in determining whether some 
human rights of some these refugees have been, or could be, 
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violated.144 The armed conflict in Myanmar remains the “longest 
running civil war in the world.”145 In terms of civil conflicts, the 
country was home to the most violence in the world between 1946 
and 2008, averaging four conflicts per year for a total of 246 “conflict 
years” over that span.146 Displacement due to violence, repression, 
and unacceptable living conditions has primarily affected two groups 
of Burmese people: ethnic minorities and political opponents of the 
military regime.147 
Following the 1962 coup d’état that placed Burma under 
permanent military control,148 General Ne Win consolidated power by 
replacing regional, ethnicity-based state councils with a system 
directly under the control of the central Burmese government.149 Ne 
Win’s regime then pursued the “Four Cuts” counterinsurgency policy, 
isolating ethnic minorities by cutting off food, funding, recruits, and 
communications to targeted communities.150 In 1984, the Burmese 
government launched a major offensive against the armed ethnic 
group Karen National Union (“KNU”) that eventually displaced 
10,000 refugees into camps across the Thai border.151 These initial 
refugees were mostly civilians who had suffered human rights abuses 
by the Burmese military (and its local proxies) under the Four Cuts 
policy.152 Although many of them expected to return to Burma once 
the violence faded, tens of thousands more Burmese refugees soon 
joined them in Thailand after fleeing similar attacks throughout Karen 
and Karenni states.153 
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Various obstacles hindered the refugees’ attempts to return to 
Myanmar—which officially changed its name from Burma in 1989, 
including the destruction of their villages, crops, and livestock, and 
the emplacement of landmines along the most accessible routes 
between the countries.154 Additionally, several hundred thousand 
more Karens, Karennis, and Mons remained internally displaced 
during this time, leaving their homes for similar reasons as the 
refugees, but remained in Myanmar due to geographical or 
government barriers.155 In the country’s west, approximately 200,000 
Rohingya Muslims also fled, seeking refuge in Bangladesh after the 
Burmese government employed similar tactics against them.156 
Beginning in 1995, the Burmese government used proxy militias 
to launch a series of cross-border offensives in areas around the Thai 
camps, forcing inhabitants to retreat within the camp confines and 
abandon any means of independently sustaining themselves.157 No 
longer able to forage for food and shelter materials, refugees soon had 
to rely for survival on direct aid from the Thai government and other 
outside sources.158 This dependency further restricted their ability—
and desire—to return to Burma, where they still had no guarantee of 
protection, and camp conditions quickly deteriorated.159 
Much international attention has focused on the situation in 
Myanmar after the government transitioned to a civilian government 
with the election of the Union Solidarity and Development Party 
(“USDP”) in November 2010 and the swearing in of Thein Sein as 
then president in March 2011. This political transition and the 
granting of other civil and political rights engendered optimism about 
Myanmar’s future where the international community has raced 
forward, lifting many sanctions against Myanmar, increasing 
international investment, and providing significant international 
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assistance funding.160 Meanwhile, insurgency movements remain 
along the border and mass displacement continues.161 Sending signals 
of confidence to the Myanmar leadership could allow the government, 
even the currently democratically elected government, to continue to 
commit human rights abuses with impunity and prematurely indicate 
to the international community that conditions are ripe for refugees to 
return to Myanmar. Determining whether it is safe for a refugee to 
return needs to be an individuated process.162 Forcing refugees to 
return to Myanmar before it is safe to do so constitutes a violation of 
the non-refoulement principle under international law.163 
There are various ongoing insurgency movements that represent 
the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups and have varying degrees of 
resolution in their peace processes.164 In January 2012, the Karen 
National Unity party signed a ceasefire with the government of 
Myanmar. Although signing this ceasefire agreement was a 
momentous occasion in the peace process,165 there have been armed 
clashes reported intermittently since August 2013 alongside peace 
negotiations.166 Conditions in Karen State remain tense and ongoing 
conflict in the area suggests that conditions may not yet be ripe for 
return. 
The Karenni insurgency movements are not waging as active of 
a resistance role since the Karenni National Progressive Party 
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(“KNPP”) signed a ceasefire in July 2012 and has been consistently 
holding peace talks with the government.167 Other Karenni 
movements are Border Guard Forces, co-opted by the Myanmar 
Government.168 The fact that there is no ongoing conflict in Kayah 
State does not mean that the conditions are safe for the Karenni to 
return, particularly since the Border Guard Forces are under 
government control169 and may require the Karenni people to work 
for defense services against their will.170 
Numerous other insurgency movements are operating along 
Myanmar’s borders,171 and the engagement of these groups will be 
critical for the achievement of a comprehensive peace process. One 
potential solution is a federalist system that reflects the inclusion of 
the demands of various ethnic minority groups in a revised 
Constitution. This could help to transition ceasefire agreements to 
long-term, sustainable peace.172 Even with various tenuous ceasefire 
agreements currently in place, until the Constitution has been revised 
to lessen military control, many Burmese people are likely to be wary 
for prospects of peace and will not likely feel safe returning home.173 
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A. Conditions in Kayin (Karen) State 
 People in Kayin State are predominantly dependent upon animal 
husbandry and agriculture for their livelihoods.174 Access to social 
services, including health and education, is poor and has declined 
with the reduction of KNU’s territorial control over Kayin State.175 Of 
major concern is the budding interest in development projects in the 
region for mining, dam construction, large-scale agricultural projects, 
rubber plantations, and army camps,176 which will impede individuals 
from engaging in their own agricultural and animal husbandry 
practices.177 In addition, these development projects will likely lead to 
widespread land grabs and displacement of Karen people without 
adequate compensation. A pattern has already been documented of 
confiscation of land by the Tatmadaw.178 
Although there are reports since the ceasefire that people in 
Kayin State feel somewhat safer to move around, it continues to be 
unstable.179  Since the ceasefire, the Tatmadaw continues to build 
new—and bolster old—army bases. Troops rotate, skirmishes 
between armed groups continue, and weapons, ammunition, and 
rations are consistently resupplied.180 These conditions have led to 
mistrust of the ceasefire and the Tatmadaw, as well as continued 
insecurity.181 There were reported instances of arbitrary arrest without 
a formal charge or access to due process as a result of acts such as 
suspected KNU collaboration, not having identification, running a 
business that competed with a Tatmadaw-run business, or traveling in 
a limited military operation area.182 Instances of torture, cruel, 
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176. See TRUCE OR TRANSITION, supra note 170, at 90 (noting that development 
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inhuman or degrading treatment, and sexual violence perpetrated by 
the Tatmadaw have been reported since the ceasefire was signed in 
2012.183 Although overall levels of forced labor have declined and are 
requested for shorter periods, this practice still continues.184 Forced 
recruitment into the Tatmadaw and Border Guard Forces remains an 
issue where individuals are coerced to join these forces against their 
will, are required to remain enlisted for longer than their term, or are 
taxed in lieu of enlistment.185 Furthermore, these demands to enlist 
are accompanied by implicit or explicit threats of violence, frequently 
compelling these individuals to comply with enlistment demands.186 
Taxes were also arbitrarily levied on people passing through military 
checkpoints with industrial, livestock, or agricultural products.187 
Landmines also pose significant threats to individuals’ 
livelihood and security throughout Kayin State. Landmines remain 
planted throughout Kayin State, most frequently protecting current or 
former Tatmadaw camps, and occasionally around agricultural areas 
or water sources.188 New mines have also allegedly been planted since 
the 2012 ceasefire, but with decreased frequency.189 The prevalence 
of landmines throughout the region has widespread implications for 
the mobility of the Kayin people and their livelihoods due to the 
difficulty of farming or raising livestock.190 
B. Conditions in Kayah (Karenni) State 
 UNHCR estimates suggest that there are 15,000 Karenni 
refugees living in Thailand, and roughly ten percent of the population 
in Kayah State has been internally displaced from the conflict.191 
Kayah State is a heavily forested, rural, mountainous state that is rich 
in natural resources, namely minerals, timber, and hydropower.192 
Kayah State is one of the most heavily landmine contaminated areas 
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in Myanmar.193 Despite terms in the KNPP’s ceasefire agreement 
with the government, the government has not begun any surveys in 
the region to determine which communities are affected by 
landmines.194 Although the landmine-related casualties have 
decreased since the ceasefire, any internally displaced persons or 
refugees returning home would be greatly at risk of incurring 
landmine-related injuries as a result of not knowing where landmines 
may be buried.195  
 
 
Within the international community, there has been much 
optimism for Myanmar’s future prospects for peace as a result of the 
initial transition from military rule to Thein Sein’s government and 
the subsequent transition to a democratically elected government. 
Although there has been notable reform in shifting the legal 
framework of civil and political rights, many of these changes ring 
hollow for Burmese citizens. Rights to assembly, freedom of 
expression, and the right to vote are largely unrealized. Prospects for 
constitutional reform are bleak. Due to the central role that 
constitutional reform occupies in ethnic insurgency movements, 
conflict within the Border States is likely to remain.196 The ceasefire 
in Kayin State has not been respected, as evidenced by skirmishes, 
ongoing militarization, and forced conscription. Conditions in Kayah 
State are comparatively better, yet the State is still riddled with 
landmines and is likely to have its natural resources exploited for 
Myanmar’s economic development. 
Conditions in Kayin and Kayah States remain insecure. Until the 
peace process provides meaningful participation for diverse ethnic 
minority groups, it is unlikely that conditions will be sufficiently safe 
within Myanmar for refugees to return. A large influx of returning 
refugees could also exacerbate already unstable conditions, especially 
if that influx interferes with the extraction of valuable resources, or if 
it creates tension between competing land ownership claims. As a 
result, any country that begins to return refugees before conditions are 
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safe for return will be in violation of their international legal 
obligations of non-refoulement.197 
 
 
b. Research Findings 
1. Access to Necessary Resources & Services 
 
 
“Everything is in a box. Access to services, including 
healthcare, education, food, and movement in and out 
of camps is very limited. I feel like everything is 
restricted. I feel like I am inside a box.”198 
A. Food 
Thailand’s tightening of its restrictions on freedom of movement 
and work has taken place immediately following significant decreases 
in donor funding for camp support.199 Donor fatigue, the global 
financial crisis, and a perception by international funders that the 
situation in Myanmar is changing have led to both an overall decrease 
in funding and a shift of existing funding from camp support in 
Thailand to direct support for programs in Myanmar.200 Despite this 
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government. Moreover, the global financial crisis continues to impact state budgets for foreign 
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decrease in support to the camps, the Thai government has not 
supplemented its own funding, supplies, or services, but instead has 
moved in the opposite direction by selectively enforced unwritten 
policies that ultimately make it even more difficult for refugees to 
meet their most basic needs. 
NGOs provide only limited resources in the camps, and the 
inability of refugees’ ability to secure additional income and 
resources outside the camps due to Thai law and policies results in the 
negative impact on their fundamental rights in a variety of areas 
including food, shelter, healthcare, and education.201 As one refugee 
commented, “Reductions are not only for rations. All services have 
been reduced. Health, rations, education, everything.”202 Many 
refugees have noted that these cuts in rations and decreases in 
essential services are among the major problems in the camps.203 
When asked why the level of support has decreased, interviewees 
offered a number of conjectures. A Karenni refugee in Na Soi Camp 
reported, “One [reason] we have heard was because there is less 
interest by donors and also higher prices and poor exchange rates.”204 
Another said, “Also maybe the resettlement program, because donors 
and people think the camp populations should be smaller, but it’s still 
the same population. Donors are focused on development, so funds 
for relief are reduced.”205 Still another commented, “Because there are 
so many refugees around the world, so the money goes to them now 
instead of us.”206 But for most, their explanation was echoed in the 
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reply of one refugee, which was simply, “I don’t know why . . . I just 
know there is not enough food.”207 
i. Funding Shortfalls 
As one NGO staff person reported: 
Funding is quickly depleting . . . [we] might not be able to 
provide the required support in 2016. Eighty percent of our 
funding goes to food and [we are] the only food provider [in the 
camps], so this will be a significant problem. Long-term funders 
are committed, but this might not be enough.208 
Most of the refugees we interviewed commented that lack of food 
was one of the biggest challenges they were facing.209 Camp residents 
suffered from chronic malnutrition and anemia even before NGOs 
announced in 2011 that they could no longer meet international 
minimum nutrition standards for Burmese refugees in the camps.210 
Typically, rations consist of some combination of rice, oil, salt, flour 
yellow bean, charcoal, Asia Mix (a vitamin supplement), and 
sometimes fish paste. Water is supplied from camp wells that 
environmental groups are responsible for keeping clean.211 
However, beginning in 2012, the situation became even less 
tenable as rations began to be cut in the camps.212 Many refugees 
reported continuing decreases in food amounts.213 In 2011, all 
refugees received at least fifteen kilograms of rice per month. Even 
those few refugees deemed vulnerable or most vulnerable now 
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receive only twelve or 13.5 kilograms per month, respectively—a 
significant reduction, especially considering that refugees were 
experiencing the effects of malnutrition even with the fifteen 
kilograms per month in 2011.214 Leaving aside these reductions for 
most vulnerable populations, the decline in the standard allotment for 
the majority of the refugee population is even more substantial. For 
example, whereas a typical individual received fifteen kilograms of 
rice per month in 2011, in 2012 that individual received only 13.5 
kilograms, and that amount soon declined to twelve kilograms and 
then to ten kilograms; some refugees have even reported that they 
now receive only eight or nine kilograms for the standard 
allotment.215 In light of this succession of cuts, rations in 2015 
amounted to no more than a standard per person allotment of 1505 
kilocalories per day, 39.5 percent below the minimum international 
standard, with additional cuts to rice and charcoal occurring in 
September 2015 [following our May 2015 field research visit].216 
NGOs are concerned ration reductions will continue.217 
All of the refugees that we interviewed confirmed that current 
rations are not enough to sustain them, and many must look for other 
options to fill the gap—options that have been greatly curtailed given 
the new restrictions on movement into and out of the camps.218 Some 
refugees noted that reduced rations have led to emotional stress 
among many in the camps.219 In particular, one interviewee said, 
“After the reductions in rations, people started to have emotional 
issues, stress, depression, [especially] because they can’t go outside 
the camp to work.”220 NGO workers commented that now most 
refugees have issues with daily survival, including their access to 
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coal, oil, rice, and fish paste.221 This also has an attendant social 
impact: refugees feel restricted in their interactions (e.g., going to a 
friend’s house for dinner).222 One service provider said, “Essentially, 
no food security also means no mental security; the ration was never 
enough, but now it’s even worse.”223 
ii. Need for Outside Sources 
Refugees also reported that, while in critical need of 
supplemental food supplies, they are unable to provide for themselves 
because they cannot leave the camps to obtain needed resources.224 
Traditionally, refugees were able to supplement their limited rations 
by gathering food in surrounding areas or working outside of the 
camps to gain income to purchase additional food items.225 As one 
refugee camp committee member told us:  
They don’t go far—and almost always for work with local Thais. 
There [was] an understanding with the Thai authorities about 
this, but refugees are also limited by the geography. They can’t 
go very far because of all the mountains around here.226 
In some cases, refugees continue to have tacit understandings with 
local Thai authorities, or they manage to find ways around camp 
entrances and exits.227 One refugee noted that “Thai authorities are 
sometimes not a problem close to the camp, but if we go farther than 
five villages away it becomes a problem. We avoid the official camp 
gates.”228 Another said:  
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As rations decrease, camp residents need to leave the camp to 
buy outside food, but to leave you need to get permission or pay 
the camp guard 500 baht. I was caught leaving by the police 
once. I had 400 baht with me, and he took 200. He let me keep 
going after he took 200.229 
A third interviewee added, “[t]hey [Thai authorities] really want them 
[refugees] to return to Burma.”230 All of the interviewees agreed that, 
since the coup, movement in and out of the camps has been restricted. 
One interviewee explained:  
This has impacted the economy inside the camps, especially 
because refugees now need to supplement their daily income, 
food, and resources outside. Refugees are now unable to access 
the economy outside the camps. After the coup, the dependency 
on rations increased at a time when the rations are decreasing the 
most. An informal economy was necessary after the reduction in 
rations. When the coup happened, they really had to depend on 
the rations more, just as they were being cut.231 
iii. Lack of Land Expansion & Arrest Penalties 
Refugees risk punishment if they attempt to gather or grow food 
beyond camp perimeters.232 One NGO staff person working in the 
camps noted that “[f]or Karen and Karenni refugees, the forest is their 
food source, but in Thailand, the Department of Forestry is strong and 
[refugees] can be punished for foraging or disturbing the forest.”233 
Individual refugees are also not permitted to use land beyond camp 
borders for farming individual plots, nor are NGOs allowed to use 
non-camp land for growing food for refugees.234 As one NGO service 
provider described:  
[A]ll produce from our agricultural program must be sold within 
the camps. Land cannot be expanded for agriculture or any other 
activity . . . . Any refugee caught farming beyond these 
boundaries would [also] be in violation of anti-deforestation laws 
and [would be] required to pay a fine. The government has set a 
boundary on camp land so it is very difficult to expand. Also, 
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boundaries are regularly patrolled, so refugees who farm beyond 
campgrounds are at risk of being arrested for deforestation. For 
instance, in April 2015, a refugee who expanded his farm beyond 
camp grounds was caught, and the area was closed leading to 
thirty people losing their farmland.235 
 B. Shelter 
Refugee access to shelter has also diminished, beginning with a 
2011 reduction in building materials.236 Thailand only allows refugees 
to build temporary shelters out of materials such as bamboo and grass 
thatching, and prohibits the construction of permanent structures 
made from more durable materials, limiting the integrity of the houses 
in which refugees can live.237 Because refugees are denied permission 
to leave the camps, refugees are prevented from acquiring additional 
outside repair materials238—posing particular difficulties during the 
rainy season when camp residents are prevented from adequately 
protecting themselves from inclement weather.239 
All supplies in the camps come from NGO providers rather than 
from the Thai authorities, so refugees become completely dependent 
on NGOs for all materials and services. Before restrictions on 
freedom of movement and right to work took place, some refugees 
would periodically leave the camps to find supplies or sources of 
additional income to supplement resources.240 One refugee we 
interviewed noted, “Since 2011, aid has been reduced. We do not 
have enough supplies . . . .”241 Another added, “At first, the support 
from [NGOs] was enough. But the last two to three years, supplies 
have started getting low, and in the future it looks like it will continue 
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Leitner Center]. 
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to be low. This is a problem for refugees.”242 A third summarized, “In 
general, camp conditions are getting worse.”243 
Thai authorities will not allow NGOs to provide permanent 
materials to refugees for shelter construction. A UNHCR staff person 
reported the Thai government “call[s] the houses in the camps 
‘temporary shelters’ and will not provide more durable roofs so that it 
does not turn into a long-term stay.”244 A local NGO also offered:  
The material to fix houses is a part of the rations, and there are 
not enough housing materials. So the rainy season becomes an 
issue. Refugees are still forced to go outside the camps to find 
leaves, bamboo and unofficial work.245  
When asked whether he built his own hut, one refugee living in Mae 
La Camp responded, “Yes. I go to the forest to get bamboo and then 
[an NGO] gives me leaves for roofing. Sometimes police catch you 
[and punish or fine you] for getting extra materials to build your 
house from the forest.”246 Another NGO staff person reported that 
now “small children are [now sometimes being sent by parents] to 
gather building materials outside the camps.”247 
C. Health Care 
The overall funding shortage has also negatively impacted 
Burmese refugees’ access to healthcare, as NGOs are no longer able 
to provide essential preventative and mental health services or 
hospital treatment.248 In Thailand, there is not free access to 
hospitals.249 If a Thai citizen has a medical card, a hospital visit is 
thirty baht, but refugees cannot acquire a medical card.250 Some 
interviewees reported that, while previously any sick camp resident 
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who was sick could be referred to a nearby hospital, now the 
individual is only referred if his or her case is “very serious.”251 Camp 
health services are limited and several interviewees said the process is 
very slow and only remedial treatments are available.252 
In general, there is less donor support for health services overall. 
“NGOs don’t want to send people to the hospital, because the expense 
is very high,” one camp resident told us.253 Another added:  
They want to save the money for more patients instead of 
spending lots of money on one patient. Also, the decision to send 
someone to a hospital isn’t made by the clinic staff. The doctor 
from the NGO makes the decision, because the NGO pays for the 
transportation to the hospital.254 
In parallel to declining rations and other services, camps have also 
seen an increase in mental health issues.255 One organization 
operating in the camps described the sharp increase in emotional 
stress and depression they have seen, with an even more noticeable 
effect on families with children.256 This organization reported that 
they have seen cases in which children start to hustle and steal 
because of constraints on provisions.257 This causes even greater 
stress for their parents. As one staff worker commented, “Because of 
the reduction [in services], there is a lot of emotional problems and 
depression. It is especially hard on the parents. There is [also now] 
more domestic violence in the camps.”258 Another camp service 
provider told us, “In 2014-15, there have been lots of issues linked 
with unnatural deaths [suicides]. This is linked to stress from daily 
live, including economic restrictions, and decrease in services.”259 
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The lack of trained NGO health workers and services also 
creates higher dependency on Burmese doctors in the camps—a 
situation that often fuels ethnic tension.260 As one NGO staff worker 
explained:  
Less money for health means you can’t send people to hospitals 
in Thailand any more. [In the camps,] there are also many 
doctors from Burma who are [ethnically] Burman. They have 
replaced some of the international doctors. This has led to ethnic 
distrust because the patients are largely Karen. Most refugees are 
there because of conflict and don’t feel safe with a Burman 
doctor.261 
D. Education 
Finally, the refugee education system is no longer affordable for 
many families because of increased tuition fees.262 In 2004, UNHCR 
coordinated the creation of an operational plan for refugee returns; as 
a part of this plan, while in the camps, refugees were to be sent to 
individual NGOs for health, livelihood, and educational services.263 
As funding for the camps decreases, NGOs are unable to continue to 
provide these services for free, which means that refugees are forced 
to make up the difference in the funding shortfall. As one NGO 
reported, “The international community should balance its donations 
between the government and also local CBOs. There are services that 
need to be provided by CBOs and they have recently been reduced—
for example, the decrease in teacher stipends.”264 
Residents of Ban Mai Nai Soi and Mae La camps, for example, 
reported that funding cuts have meant that families must now pay 
school fees.265 As refugees in Na Soi reported:  
There is now a registration fee. Before, there was no fee, but now 
it is about fifty baht. This goes toward the teacher stipend . . . . 
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This change is because there is not now enough money for 
teachers’ stipends, and the parents want to keep the teachers.266 
Refugees in other camps reported similar situations, with rates as high 
as 200 baht per student, and projected further increases.267 
The quality of education in the camps has also suffered, as lower 
pay leads to higher turnover rates and inadequate training for 
teachers.268 Several refugees we interviewed reported that, in general, 
the quality of education in the camps has deteriorated because the 
services are not fully supported.269 For example, the variety of 
educational programming offered is decreasing.270 Some NGO 
educational programs are transitioning their curriculum to focus on 
more general principles.271  The number of teachers available to teach 
has also been reduced due to resettlement of trained teachers or 
lowered teacher stipends.272 
There is a limited amount of secondary education offered in the 
camps; one service provider reported that some post-tenth grade 
standard educational training for teachers and health medics has been 
allowed, but these programs are only limited to between thirty to forty 
people a year.273 Even when secondary educational programs are 
offered, certificates are not recognized outside the camps, and there 
are no employment opportunities.274 One NGO officer said, “The 
young people in the camps don’t know what to do with their 
education. They also don’t understand the importance of 
education.”275 
2. Ability to Move Freely & Work 
As one refugee explained:  
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I was born in Karen . . . . I am a camp resident, but I have to be 
able to take the risk of going outside the camp to be able to help 
the community. The government lets me leave sometimes if I 
provide a cash payment. But they know we are here [outside the 
camp], and so I can technically be arrested. Security in the 
refugee camp has been tightened [since the coup]. It is very 
difficult for people to leave when security is tight. When we are 
not able to leave, we must even close our assistance office, which 
is located just outside of the camp.276 
Following the May 2014 coup and the enactment of the interim 
Constitution,277 the situation for refugees on the ground has become 
strikingly less secure.278 Since the coup, Thailand has more strictly 
enforced prohibitions on leaving the camps.279 Camp passes granting 
permission for temporary leave are more difficult to obtain and more 
limited in scope and duration.280 If any written policies ever existed 
detailing rules on refugee movement outside the camps, they have not 
been made available to the public. Previously, whatever prohibitions 
may have been in place were not enforced, allowing many refugees to 
find ways of securing outside employment, building supplies, and 
food.281 However, since the coup, refugees have reported that egress 
has been tightly limited; many have even described instances where 
Thai authorities have set up surprise checkpoints at areas surrounding 
camp perimeters and arrested exiting refugees.282 
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A. Changes in Thai Policies Regarding Movement 
After the coup, Thai authorities began enforcing a number of 
camp policies, including severely restricting movement in and out of 
the camps.283 As one resident reported:  
[There have been] lots of discussions about the return issue. 
Before the last few years, there was no talk about this. The Thai 
government is starting to enforce some policies. Once services 
are reduced, more people are cutting down trees to grow food. 
Then the law policy for deforestation started to be enforced. And 
there are more restrictions on movement.284 
There are no public written records of these policies restricting 
movement.285 Thai authorities insist that these policies have always 
existed; it is just that now these policies are actually being enforced. 
While some camp leaders—who can sometimes be aligned with Thai 
political interests or who may feel the need to represent Thai 
authorities favorably in order to maintain power for themselves or 
rights for their represented communities—occasionally claimed in 
interviews that movement was not restricted,286 all of the evidence 
seems to point to the contrary. Right after the coup, reported 
restrictions on movement were at their most severe. Even now, 
restrictions are much more stringently enforced than prior to the 
coup.287 The actual flexibility of those restrictions still varies 
somewhat from camp to camp and in response to certain events that 
take place in camps—for example, restrictions are enforced more 
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absolutely during periods when head counts of refugees are taking 
place.288 
There are some very limited circumstances that will allow a 
refugee to gain official permission to leave the camp. One camp 
resident explained, “If people go out for farming, they cannot tell the 
authorities. If there is some special reason they must leave, they can 
ask for permission. This would be for a big gathering, like a 
dinner.”289 Staff at UNHCR clarified that, “refugees can request 
access to go outside for four limited reasons: medical referral from 
NGO; travel to another camp (NGO-facilitated); vocational training 
(most likely coordinated by Thai actors); and humanitarian 
reasons.”290 
In general, refugees are aware that their ability to leave is not 
what it once was. As one interviewee said:  
We cannot move as easily [as we could before the coup]. It is 
harder to get work. We also used to be able to visit people, but 
now we have to get permission from the camp commander. The 
permission is only for one week now. Before it was longer.291 
Even when camp passes are issued, they are now more 
expensive and allow fewer days outside the camp. As a refugee in 
another camp reported, “The camp pass is only three days now—
down from one month, and the pass costs 200 baht. It is more difficult 
to go outside and work.”292 
Sometimes the camp pass is less official. One refugee 
commented that, as for entry and exit to the camps, “you’ve got to 
grease the palms on the way in,” curiously adding, “It’s not 
corruption. It’s just business.”293 Another interviewee explained, “The 
camp policies have tightened up, by that I mean that the exchange 
between the guards and refugees is like this: ‘It’s more difficult to 
leave this month. How much more difficult? About 200 baht more 
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difficult.’”294 A third interviewee from another camp simply reported 
that, “since 2012, it has become more difficult for the refugees to 
move around without a camp pass. Normally, they could sneak out of 
the camps, but right now they cannot.”295 NGOs have reported that, 
where before there were unofficial openings, now fences are also 
physically closed off.296 
Regardless of whether a refugee is given official permission to 
leave the camp for a temporary period, refugees are not technically 
allowed to work outside the camps, despite some pressure from 
NGOs and UNHCR to allow them to do so. Though many do actually 
secretly work outside the camps, the Thai government refuses to 
acknowledge that this takes place.297 Refugees caught outside the 
camps are subject to arrest, and many interviewees described such 
arrests happening to them or to others that they know.298 Some 
refugees have suggested that the rules are stricter now, “[m]aybe 
because MOI wants to restore order, maybe because it gets 
complaints from locals, or maybe because of bigger changes between 
Thailand and Burma.”299 
B. Thai Policies Allowing Limited Movement 
There seems to be some variance in how movements outside of 
camps are regulated. Aside from camp passes, the situations that seem 
the most advantageous for refugees are those where unofficial 
movement seems to be relatively tolerated. For example, in one camp 
an NGO staff worker reported, “There is a new policy that not more 
than 100 can leave per day. It is all unofficial. The camp doesn’t want 
to make a record, because if someone higher up sees the record, they 
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might get in trouble.”300 Another account reflected similar 
information:  
Since the coup, checkpoints have been put in place for anyone 
going in and out, but because there are no fences, people can still 
leave. The military wanted to set up proper checkpoints that 
monitor how many people leave and how many people return. 
District officers avoided this by guaranteeing that they can 
control the crowds and set a quota of 100 people.301 
In some of these cases, camp committees collect monthly data on who 
leaves or enters the camps.302 If a person leaves the camp for a day, 
they are included in those numbers. Only those who leave the camps 
for a month or two are excluded.303 One camp committee noted, for 
example, that each month only about thirty refugees leave and thirty 
enter.304 
Rules do vary to some degree from camp to camp. Depending on 
how isolated the camp is from populated areas, in some cases, 
authorities will allow camp residents to leave the camp as long as they 
stay within a certain proximity of camp boundaries. For example, 
when a refugee living in an isolated camp in the north of Thailand 
was asked whether refugees were allowed to leave the camp, he 
replied:  
Yes, to supplement their rations. They don’t go far and almost 
always to work with local Thais. There is an understanding with 
the Thai authorities about this, but refugees are also limited by 
the geography; they can’t go very far because of all the 
mountains around here. Thai authorities are not a problem close 
to the camp, but if we go farther than five villages away it 
becomes a problem. We avoid the official camp gates.305 
Another refugee likewise reported:  
People can’t go far, but we can do local farm labor. The Thai 
authorities are flexible, as long as everyone doesn’t try to do it. 
Stay in small groups. Also, NGOs provide some farmable land 
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just outside the camp . . . . [But] one day roundtrip—farther is not 
allowed.306 
In some cases, it works differently, even with different Thai 
authorities within the same camp. As one refugee said:  
Sometimes we just go through the checkpoint, no questions 
asked. Or, if there are questions, we just tell them the truth—that 
we’re going out to work on a farm. NGOs have explained to the 
guards and set up a relationship with them so that they 
understand the project.307  
Another NGO worker explained:  
Although the rule is that they are not allowed to work outside the 
camp, there is an understanding that they work in Mae Sot. There 
is usually some negotiation process with the Thai authorities or 
the camp commander—for example, for humanitarian reasons.308 
In other cases, refugees might be arrested, but will be released shortly 
thereafter without further penalty. For example, a refugee from 
another remote camp explained:  
Our camp is far from the towns and because most people around 
here are Karen Thai, we rarely have any issues. Refugees 
however might get arrested in Mae Sariang. There is an 
understanding between Thai authorities and refugees, but if 
arrested they are locked up in detention centers for a few days 
and then released to the camps.309 
C. Penalties for Being Caught Leaving the Camps 
However, these unofficial understandings are the exception rather 
than the rule. Many refugees noted that camp residents who wish to 
leave the camps for work or other purposes are forced to use points of 
entry and egress that are not monitored by camp authorities. For 
example, one resident reported, “I know of three [roads that go in and 
out of the camps], but there could be more. Local authorities are 
aware of some of these back roads. They just don’t do anything to 
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monitor them.”310 Another told us, “If people go to look for work, 
they use the short cut in and out of the camp.”311 Using these “secret” 
shortcuts comes with risks. As one refugee described, “[S]ometimes 
the Thai authorities will conduct spot checks. Military, MOI, police, 
and immigration authorities make surprise stops at shortcut entrances 
and arrest refugees.”312 Refugees are aware that there can be serious 
consequences for sneaking out of the camps. One interviewee 
explained:  
If a refugee gets caught outside the camp, sometimes they are 
simply forced to pay a bribe at the checkpoint of 50-200 baht, 
and if they can’t pay, they are then arrested or detained. Refugees 
know this and won’t leave if they don’t have the money to pay 
the bribes.313  
One refugee added, “If you come out of the camp, you become 
illegal. You can be arrested at any time. Once, the police came to the 
camp rear entrance and just made arrests . . . .”314 
UNHCR has also confirmed that there have been arrests for 
people trying to go out to work.315 One refugee interviewee described 
a typical encounter:  
I went out of the camp, and the police didn’t see me on my way 
out. I was going to the city center. I walked for three to four days. 
Then I got sick and I wanted to go back. But the police set up a 
checkpoint, and I was arrested on the way back to the camp. I 
didn’t have my ID. I was detained for one day. I paid some 
money (3,500 baht), and then I was released.316  
Another interviewee reported that, if detained, refugees would be 
required to pay a fine of 1,000 baht at a detention center or 2,500 baht 
at the immigration office.317 
When a refugee is arrested for being caught outside the camp 
perimeter, refugee committees oftentimes try to work with Thai 
                                                                                                             
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. (“If you go by the main road, the police will catch you but you can go through 
the back secretly.”).  
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
315. Interview with UNHCR officer, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file 
with Leitner Center]. 
316. Interview with refugee, in Thailand (May 2015) [Interview record on file with 
Leitner Center]. 
317. Id. 
374 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
authorities to secure the release and return of the refugee to the camp. 
As one Committee Secretary described:  
KNRC works with the Thai authorities. If [the camp resident] 
was only going to the village, it’s usually okay—here there is an 
understanding with the Thai authorities. But if the refugee is 
going beyond Nai Soi, then it is unsure what will happen. Also, 
sometimes the Thai authorities pick up refugees, drive beyond 
the boundaries, and then arrest them there. The fine is between 
2,000 and 4,000 baht, and they can spend up to thirty days in 
jail.318 
Once fines are paid and the refugee is released from jail, he/she can 
typically return to the camp.319 However, the refugee may also be 
deported; this happened more frequently before camp refugee 
committees began negotiating with Thai authorities to let jailed 
refugees return to the camp.320 Often, if refugees are deported, they 
take advantage of the next opportunity to sneak back to the camps 
across the border. As one interviewee described:  
One time I got sent back to Burma, but I just came back. I swam 
across the river. It’s easy [to swim], but there are police there. I 
was put in jail for two days. The jail was difficult. It was like 
living in a toilet because it was so small.321 
D. Local Thai Attitudes 
While Thai authorities may restrict movement in part to address 
Thai political concerns regarding protection of the domestic labor 
market, in reality, reactions of local Thai populations to Burmese 
refugees may be more nuanced. In general, popular attitudes in 
Thailand about refugees can be negative, often fueled by political 
rhetoric and media reports that can disproportionately highlight 
crimes linked to individuals from urban refugee communities, but 
Thai communities living in more rural areas near refugee camps may 
not react to refugees in the same way, and may sometimes even find 
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value in an alternative labor market.322 For example, as one 
community member noted:  
During the rainy season, the farmers start to plant. The refugees 
come out from the camps and help Thai farmers and earn daily 
wages. During the harvest season, it is the same. The refugees 
don’t have money for their families, so they go out to look for 
work. Thais pay less [labor costs] for refugees than for other 
[local] Thai [workers], so the farmers want to [employ] more 
refugees.323  
When asked whether Thai people in the communities around the 
camps are receptive or welcoming to refugees, we were told that 
“they don’t really like them, but they also want them as workers.”324 
But some refugees have reported that they do not feel welcome 
in the local community and that sometimes interactions with the Thai 
community can have negative consequences. One camp resident 
explained that, “Thai villagers complain that refugees are stealing and 
causing trouble” and “refugees get targeted by the locals.”325 An NGO 
worker further commented:  
[The crackdown on movement and the work] is about a need for 
control on the part of the Thai government. It’s also a cultural 
and political play. Thai society views migrants and refugees as a 
threat to jobs and are thus not welcoming to the refugees.326 
Refugees attempt to leave the camp because they are unable to 
secure enough resources within the camp, especially as donor funded 
rations and supplies decrease. As one refugee described, “In the 
camp, supplies and schooling comes from [NGOs]. [Refugees] are 
dependent on [these NGO services]. There is not enough in the 
camps, so some people leave the camps to find jobs.”327 
An NGO worker also explained how this situation has become 
untenable:  
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Since the coup, movement in and out of the camps has been 
restricted. This has impacted the economy inside the camps, 
especially because refugees now need to supplement their daily 
income, food and resources outside. Previously, each family got 
ten to twelve kilos of rice per month, but it has now been reduced 
to eight kilos per month. Refugees are now unable to access the 
economy outside the camps. After the coup, the dependency on 
rations increased at a time when the rations [were] decreasing the 
most. An informal economy was necessary after the reduction in 
rations. When the coup happened, they really had to depend on 
the rations more, just as they were being cut.328 
Restrictions on movement and the right to work can be especially 
difficult for younger camp residents. A service provider reported, 
“The younger generation …are [feeling] hopeless because they are 
stuck in camps and cannot work. They can see through technology 
that the world has more to offer than what they have.”329 
But for both young and old, restrictions on movement have 
essentially turned these camps into de facto detention centers. As one 
NGO framed it, it’s as simple as: “[c]amp residents used to also be 
able to walk outside; now, they cannot.”330 
 
III. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LEGAL PROTECTIONS TO BURMESE REFUGEES 
LIVING IN THAILAND 
 
While Thailand is not a party331 to the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”)332 and its 1967 
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Optional Protocol,333 the rights of refugees living in Thailand are still 
protected by the many international human rights treaties to which 
Thailand is a State party.334 Critically, these treaties protect the rights 
of everyone living in the jurisdiction, not just the citizens of the State 
party. For refugees living in Thailand, these rights include the right to 
food, housing, health care, and education; freedom of movement; the 
right to work; and protection from refoulement. 
 
a. Right to an Adequate Standard of Living (Food & Shelter), Health 
Care, & Education 
1. Characterization of Rights to Adequate Standard of Living (Food & 
Shelter), Health Care, & Education 
 
The right to an adequate standard of living (including food and 
shelter), health care, education, and other socio-economic rights are 
chiefly protected in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), to which Thailand is a State 
party.335 These rights are also protected in a similar manner in three 
other derivative core human rights conventions to which Thailand is a 
State party: the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”),336 the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(“CEDAW”),337 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“CRC”).338 In particular, as applies to all refugees living within 
Thailand’s jurisdiction, ICESCR Articles 11, 12, and 13 protect the 
rights to an adequate standard of living, access to health care, and 
education, respectively.339 
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A. Food 
ICESCR Article 11 mandates: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his 
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international 
co-operation based on free consent.340 
The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(“CESCR”), the treaty body mechanism for the ICESCR, has 
affirmed:  
[T]he right to adequate food is indivisibly linked to the inherent 
dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the 
fulfilment of other human rights enshrined in the International 
Bill of Human Rights[; the right to adequate food] is also 
inseparable from social justice, requiring the adoption of 
appropriate economic, environmental and social policies, at both 
the national and international levels, oriented to the eradication of 
poverty and the fulfilment of all human rights for all.341 
The Committee considers that the core content of the right to 
adequate food implies the availability of food in a quantity and 
quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, and that 
the accessibility of such food is secured in ways that are sustainable 
and that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights.342 
Dietary needs means that the diet as a whole contains a mix of 
nutrients for physical and mental growth, development and 
maintenance, and physical activity that are in compliance with human 
physiological needs.343 At a minimum, “every State is obliged to 
ensure for everyone under its jurisdiction access to the minimum 
essential food which is sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe, to 
ensure their freedom from hunger.”344 Furthermore, accessibility 
encompasses both economic and physical accessibility: “Economic 
accessibility applies to any acquisition pattern or entitlement through 
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which people procure their food and is a measure of the extent to 
which it is satisfactory for the enjoyment of the right to adequate 
food.”345 The Committee also notes that socially vulnerable groups, 
specially disadvantaged groups, and particularly impoverished 
segments of the population may need attention through special 
programs.346 
 
Per ICESCR Article 11, Thailand has an obligation under 
international law to protect and take appropriate steps to ensure the 
realization of the rights for everyone within its jurisdiction to an 
adequate standard of living.347 As a component of this obligation, 
Thailand must provide or allow access to food within the refugee 
camps in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs 
of camp residents.348 The diet of camp residents must as a whole 
contains a mix of nutrients for physical and mental growth, 
development and maintenance, and physical activity that are in 
compliance with human physiological needs.349 At a minimum, 
Thailand must provide access to an amount and type of food which is 
sufficient, nutritionally adequate, and safe to ensure freedom from 
hunger—even if this means Thailand is required to implement special 
programs to accommodate these vulnerable refugee populations.350 In 
contrast to fulfilling these obligations, in 2015, refugees were 
receiving only ten kilograms of rice per month—amounting to no 
more than a standard per person allotment of 1505 kilocalories per 
day—which is 39.5 percent below the minimum international 
standard.351 As rations continue to decline, Thailand is neither 
supplementing additional food supplies, nor actively working with 
donor countries to increase funding to meet basic nutrition 
standards.352 
                                                                                                             
345. Id. ¶ 13. 
346. Id. 
347. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 11. 
348. Id. ¶ 8. 
349. Id. ¶ 9. 
350. Id. ¶ 14. 
351. See TBC JANUARY–JUNE 2015 PROGRAMME REPORT, supra note 200, at 25. 
352. See supra Section II.b.1.A, Food. 
380 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
B. Shelter 
In terms of shelter, the Committee has stated that “the human 
right to adequate housing, which is thus derived from the right to an 
adequate standard of living, is [also] of central importance for the 
enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.”353 
The Committee also notes: 
The right to housing should not be interpreted in a narrow or 
restrictive sense which equates it with, for example, the shelter 
provided by merely having a roof over one’s head . . . . Rather it 
should be seen as the right to live somewhere in security, peace 
and dignity. This is appropriate for at least two reasons. In the 
first place, the right to housing is integrally linked to other human 
rights and to the fundamental principles upon which the 
Covenant is premised. This “the inherent dignity of the human 
person” from which the rights in the Covenant are said to derive 
requires that the term “housing” be interpreted so as to take 
account of a variety of other considerations, most importantly 
that the right to housing should be ensured to all persons 
irrespective of income or access to economic resources. 
Secondly, the reference in article 11 (1) must be read as referring 
not just to housing but to adequate housing. As both the 
Commission on Human Settlements and the Global Strategy for 
Shelter to the Year 2000 have stated: “Adequate shelter means ... 
adequate privacy, adequate space, adequate security, adequate 
lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and 
adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities - all at 
a reasonable cost.”354 
The Committee has highlighted habitability, as well as availability of 
services, materials, facilities, and infrastructure as key concepts in the 
evaluation of housing’s adequacy.355 In one Comment, the Committee 
noted, “Adequate housing must be habitable, in terms of providing the 
inhabitants with adequate space and protecting them from cold, damp, 
heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural hazards, and 
disease vectors.”356 The Committee has gone on to stipulate that 
“[t]he physical safety of occupants must be guaranteed as well,” 
especially considering “inadequate and deficient housing and living 
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conditions are invariably associated with higher mortality and 
morbidity rates.”357 Additionally, “an adequate house must contain 
certain facilities essential for health, security, comfort and 
nutrition.”358 Finally, the Committee has stated:  
All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have 
sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe 
drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, 
sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse 
disposal, site drainage and emergency services.359 
 
Per ICESCR Article 11, Thailand must also provide camp 
residents with appropriate materials for shelter.360 Providing shelter 
means more than simply supplying a roof; rather, Thailand is 
obligated to ensure that camp residents are able to live somewhere in 
security, peace, and dignity. 361 Accommodations must be habitable—
meaning refugees must be able to access appropriate services, 
materials, facilities, and infrastructure.362 To be habitable, camp 
housing must provide adequate space and protection from cold, damp, 
heat, rain, wind, and other threats to health, structural hazards, and 
disease vectors.363 Refugees must also have sustainable access to 
natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for 
cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means 
of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency 
services.364 In contrast, Thailand will not allow camp residents to 
build shelters with more durable materials such as corrugated steel, 
but will only permit use of impermanent materials such as bamboo 
and leaf thatching.365 As available materials decline, authorities will 
also not allow refugees access to areas outside of camp to collect 
natural resources for building and repairs, possibly rendering these 
shelters neither safe not habitable.366 
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C. Health Care 
ICESCR Article 12 mandates: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health. The steps to be taken by the States 
Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of 
this right shall include those necessary for . . . [t]he provision for 
the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for 
the healthy development of the child; . . . [t]he prevention, 
treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, . . . and other 
diseases; [and t]he creation of conditions which would assure to 
all medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness.367 
The Committee notes that “[h]ealth is a fundamental human right 
indispensable for the exercise of other human rights [and that e]very 
human being is entitled to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of health conducive to living a life in dignity.”368 “The 
entitlements [protected by the Covenant] include the right to a system 
of health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people 
to enjoy the highest attainable level of health,”369 and “the right to 
health must be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a variety of 
facilities, goods, services, and conditions necessary for the realization 
of the highest attainable standard of health.”370 
The Committee has also stated that the “[f]unctioning public 
health and healthcare facilities, goods and services, as well as 
programs, have to be available in sufficient quantity within the State 
party, and they have to be physically accessible.”371 In terms of 
accessibility, relevant “health facilities, goods, and services must be 
within safe physical reach for all sections of the population, especially 
vulnerable or marginalized groups.”372 Furthermore:  
[A]s well as being culturally acceptable, health facilities, goods, 
and services must also be scientifically and medically appropriate 
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and of good quality; this requires skilled medical personnel, 
scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital 
equipment, safe and potable water, and adequate sanitation.373 
Thus:  
[t]he Committee mandates that the creation of conditions which 
would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the 
event of sickness, both physical and mental, includes the 
provision of equal and timely access to basic preventive, 
curative, rehabilitative health services, and health education; 
regular screening programs; appropriate treatment of prevalent 
diseases, illnesses, injuries, and disabilities, preferably at 
community level; the provision of essential drugs; and 
appropriate mental health treatment and care.374  
Specifically, the Committee points out that the associated “right to 
treatment includes the creation of a system of urgent medical care in 
cases of accidents, epidemics, and similar health hazards, and the 
provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in emergency 
situations.”375 In its comment, the Committee states: 
In particular, States are under the obligation to respect the right 
to health by, inter alia, refraining from denying or limiting equal 
access for all persons, including prisoners or detainees, 
minorities, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants, to preventive, 
curative and palliative health services; abstaining from enforcing 
discriminatory practices as a State policy . . . .376 
 
Per ICESCR Article 12, Thailand must protect and take 
appropriate steps to ensure the right of refugees living within its 
jurisdiction to access adequate health care services.377 This right 
includes enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services, and 
conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable 
standard of health.378 Camp residents must have access to a sufficient 
number of functioning health care facilities and practitioners.379 
Facilities must be within safe physical reach for all sections of the 
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refugee population—either appropriate facilities within the camps 
themselves, or unfettered access to facilities in close proximity to the 
camps.380 Health facilities, goods, and services for refugees must also 
be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality; this 
requires skilled medical personnel, scientifically approved and 
unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and potable water, and 
adequate sanitation.381 Refugees must also have equal and timely 
access to basic preventive, curative, rehabilitative health services, and 
health education; regular screening programs; appropriate treatment 
of prevalent diseases, illnesses, injuries, and disabilities; the provision 
of essential drugs; and appropriate mental health treatment and 
care.382 In particular, Thailand is required to provide access to these 
services to refugees as part of its obligations to provide disaster relief 
and humanitarian assistance in emergency situations.383 Thailand is 
under the obligation to respect the right to health by refraining from 
denying or limiting equal access for all persons, including prisoners 
or detainees, minorities, asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants, to 
preventive, curative and palliative health services and by abstaining 
from enforcing discriminatory practices as a state policy.384 In 
contrast, as health services provided by NGOs continue to decline due 
to funding shortages, Thailand is not supplying additional services or 
allowing refugees to access public resources outside the camps unless 
a medical emergency exists; nor is Thailand actively working with 
donor countries to increase funding to meet basic health standards; 
build new facilities within camps; or ensure that existing services are 
available, accessible, and of an appropriate quality.385 
 
D. Education 
ICESCR Article 13 mandates: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to education. They agree that education shall be 
directed to the full development of the human personality and the 
sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human 
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rights and fundamental freedoms. . . . The States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full 
realization of this right [that p]rimary education shall be 
compulsory and available free to all [and s]econdary education in 
its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary 
education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all 
by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive 
introduction of free education.386 
As the Committee describes: 
Education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable 
means of realizing other human rights. As an empowerment 
right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically 
and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves 
out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their 
communities. Education has a vital role in empowering women, 
safeguarding children from exploitative and hazardous labour 
and sexual exploitation, promoting human rights and democracy, 
protecting the environment, and controlling population growth. 
Increasingly, education is recognized as one of the best financial 
investments States can make. But the importance of education is 
not just practical: a well-educated, enlightened and active mind, 
able to wander freely and widely, is one of the joys and rewards 
of human existence.387 
The Committee has explicitly stated that functioning educational 
institutions and programs have to be available in sufficient quantity 
and have to be accessible to everyone, without discrimination.388 In 
terms of physical accessibility, “education has to be within safe 
physical reach.”389 In terms of economic accessibility, education in 
general has to be affordable to all, and primary education specifically 
must be free for all.390 Finally, the form and substance of education, 
including curricula, and teaching methods, must also be of an 
acceptable quality.391 
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Per ICESCR Article 13, Thailand must also protect and take 
appropriate steps to ensure the right of refugees living within its 
jurisdiction to access adequate education services.392 Camp residents 
must have access to a sufficient number of functioning educational 
facilities and educators.393 Schools must be within safe physical reach 
for all sections of the refugee population—either appropriate facilities 
within the camps themselves, or unfettered access to facilities in close 
proximity to the camps. 394 In terms of economic accessibility, 
education in general has to be affordable, and primary education 
specifically must be free for all refugee children.395 The form and 
substance of education in the camps, including curricula, and teaching 
methods, must also be of an acceptable quality.396 In contrast, as 
educational services provided by NGOs continue to decline due to 
funding shortages, refugee educational needs must be met with fewer 
schools and fewer and less qualified teachers.397 Families of students, 
including primary students, are now often required to pay school 
fees.398 Thailand is not supplying additional services or allowing 
refugees to access public schools outside the camps; nor is Thailand 
actively working with donor countries to increase funding to meet 
basic education standards; build new facilities within camps; or 
ensure that existing services are available, accessible and of an 
appropriate quality.399 
 
2. ICESCR Framework Underpinning Rights to Adequate Standard of 
Living (Food & Shelter), Health Care, & Education 
 
A. Respect, Protect, Fulfill 
The right to an adequate standard of living—including food and 
shelter, as well as the rights to access to health care and education— 
impose three types or levels of obligations on State parties: the 
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obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.400 In turn, the 
obligation to fulfill incorporates both an obligation to facilitate and an 
obligation to provide.401 The obligation to respect existing access to 
adequate food [shelter, health care, and educational services] requires 
States parties not to take any measures that result in preventing such 
access.402 The obligation to protect requires measures by the State to 
ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of 
their access.403 The obligation to fulfill (facilitate) means the State 
must proactively engage in activities intended to strengthen people’s 
access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure the 
protection of these rights.404 As the Committee has stated, 
“[W]henever an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond 
their control, to enjoy these rights to adequate food [shelter, health 
care, and education] by the means at their disposal, States have the 
obligation to fulfill (provide) that right directly.”405 The Committee 
has also noted:  
The obligation to fulfill (facilitate) requires States . . . to take 
positive measures that enable and assist individuals and 
communities to enjoy…[their] right[s]…. States parties are also 
obliged to fulfill (provide) a specific right contained in the 
Covenant when individuals or a group are unable, for reasons 
beyond their control, to realize that right themselves by the 
means at their disposal.406  
The Committee particularly emphasizes, especially in relation to 
securing appropriate food resources, that “[t]his obligation also 
applies for persons who are victims of natural or other disasters.”407 
These obligations include providing nutritiously safe food and potable 
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drinking water, ensuring basic sanitation and adequate housing and 
living conditions, providing “a sufficient number of hospitals, clinics 
and other health-related facilities,” and “actively developing a system 
of schools, including building classrooms, delivering suitable 
programming, providing teaching materials, training teachers, and 
paying teachers them domestically competitive salaries.”408 
 
The right to an adequate standard of living—including food 
and shelter, as well as the rights to access to health care and 
education, impose these three types or levels of obligations on 
Thailand regarding refugees within its jurisdiction.409 In particular, 
Thailand’s obligation to fulfill incorporates both an obligation to 
facilitate and an obligation to provide.410 The obligation to facilitate 
requires that Thailand proactively engage in activities intended to 
strengthen refugee access to and utilization of resources and means to 
ensure the protection of these fundamental rights.411 The obligation to 
provide requires that, whenever an individual or group is unable for 
reasons beyond their control to enjoy these rights by the means at 
their disposal, Thailand has the obligation to provide that right 
directly.412 Especially in relation to securing appropriate food 
resources, Thailand’s obligation extends to particularly vulnerable 
populations, including populations such as refugees who are victims 
of emergency disasters.413 These obligations include providing 
nutritiously safe food and potable drinking water; ensuring basic 
sanitation and adequate housing and living conditions; providing a 
sufficient number of hospitals, clinics and other health-related 
facilities; and actively developing a system of schools, including 
building classrooms, delivering suitable programming, providing 
teaching materials, training teachers, and paying teachers them 
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domestically competitive salaries.414 Not only has Thailand not met 
its obligations under international human rights law to fulfill these 
rights. Perhaps even more egregiously, Thailand has also failed to 
respect and protect existing access to adequate food [shelter, health 
care, and educational services] by taking measures such as restricting 
egress from the camps and by denying refugees the right to work that 
directly result in preventing such access.415  
 
B. How Violations Occur: Commission or Omission 
Violations of these rights can occur through acts of 
commission—the direct action of States or other entities insufficiently 
regulated by States—or by acts of omission—the failure of a State to 
take steps required by the Covenant.416 Examples of violations 
include adoption of legislation or policies that are manifestly 
incompatible with pre-existing legal obligations relating to protected 
rights; the prevention of access to humanitarian aid—particularly food 
aid—in internal conflicts or other emergency situations; failure to 
take measures that address de facto discrimination; denial of access to 
particular resources or services necessary to secure the right for 
individuals or groups, whether the discrimination is based on 
legislation or is proactive; and the failure of a State to take into 
account its international legal obligations regarding protected rights 
when entering into agreements with other States or with international 
organizations.417 
 
Thailand is violating the rights of these refugees under 
international human rights law by both its inaction (acts of omission) 
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and by direct actions (acts of commission).418 First, as resources to the 
camps provided by outside funders decline, Thailand is not filling 
those resource gaps to meet its international obligations under the 
ICESCR.419 Second, in addition to this inaction, Thailand is also  
directly enforcing policies such as restrictions on the freedom of 
movement and the right to work.420 These direct actions [strategically] 
prevent refugees from accessing necessary foodstuffs, supplies, and 
services necessary for securing their rights to food, shelter, health 
care, and education—violations which include adoption of legislation 
or policies that are manifestly incompatible with pre-existing legal 
obligations relating to protected rights; the prevention of access to 
humanitarian aid, particularly food aid, in internal conflicts or other 
emergency situations; and denial of access to particular resources or 
services necessary to secure these rights.421 
 
C. Minimum Core & No Retrogressive Measures or Discrimination 
In General Comment 3, the Committee confirms that States 
Parties have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very 
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights enunciated in the 
Covenant. In the Committee’s view: 
[T]hese core obligations include at least the following 
obligations: 
(a) To ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods 
and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for 
vulnerable or marginalized groups; 
(b) To ensure access to the minimum essential food which 
is nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from 
hunger to everyone; 
(c) To ensure access to basic shelter, housing and 
sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and potable 
water; 
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(d) To provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined 
under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs; 
(e) To ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, 
goods and services.422 
The Committee also states that, “[s]hould a State party argue that 
resource constraints make it impossible to provide access to food, 
shelter, health care, or educational services for those who are unable 
by themselves to secure such access, the State has to demonstrate that 
every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal in an 
effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.”423 The Committee also adds: 
This follows from article 2.1 of the Covenant, which obliges a 
State party to take the necessary steps to the maximum of its 
available resources. . . . A State claiming that it is unable to carry 
out its obligation for reasons beyond its control therefore has the 
burden of proving that this is the case and that it has 
unsuccessfully sought to obtain international support to ensure 
the availability and accessibility of the necessary [resource].424 
The Committee also confirms that “[a] State party cannot, under any 
circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with [these] 
core obligations, which are non-derogable.”425 Most especially, even 
under severe resource constraints, the right to adequate food must be 
fulfilled. 426 As the Committee mandates:  
Even where a State faces severe resource constraints, whether 
caused by a process of economic adjustment, economic 
recession, climatic conditions or other factors, measures should 
be undertaken to ensure that the right to adequate food is 
                                                                                                             
422. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, 
¶ 10, Gen. Comment 3, E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990); Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 
43 (citing International Conference on Population and Development, Report, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, Ch. I, Resol. 1 (Sept. 5-13, 1994)) (“Read in conjunction with more 
contemporary instruments, such as the Programme of Action of the International Conference 
on Population and Development, the Alma-Ata Declaration provides compelling guidance on 
the core obligations arising from article 12.”). 
423. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen. 
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 17. 
424. Id. 
425. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 47. 
426. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen. 
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 28. 
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especially fulfilled for vulnerable population groups and 
individuals.427 
Furthermore, “as with all other rights in the Covenant, there is a 
strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the 
right to [food, shelter, health, and education] are not permissible.”428 
As the Committee states:  
If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State 
party has the burden of proving that they have been introduced 
after the most careful consideration of all alternatives and that 
they are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant in the context of the full use of the 
State party’s maximum available resources.429 
Finally, per the prohibition contained in ICESCR Article 2, any 
discrimination in access to food, shelter, health care, and educational 
services—as well as to means and entitlements for its procurement—
on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, age, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status 
with the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the equal 
enjoyment or exercise of economic, social, and cultural rights, 
constitutes a violation of the Covenant.430 While the Covenant 
provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the constraints 
due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes on State 
parties various obligations that are of immediate effect. The 
Committee specifically points out that, even in times of severe 
resource constraints, the vulnerable members of society must be 
protected.431 State parties have immediate obligations in relation to 
the protection of these rights, such as the “guarantee” that the right 
“will be exercised without discrimination of any kind.”432 The 
                                                                                                             
427. Id. 
428. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 32 (referencing General Comment 3, 
¶ 9 and General Comment 13, ¶ 45). 
429. Id. 
430. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen. 
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶¶ 6, 18; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to 
Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 43-45; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural 
Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 
368, ¶¶ 12, 18-19. 
431. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Nature of States Parties' Obligations, 
Gen. Comment 3, supra note 422, ¶ 12. 
432. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen. 
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 30. 
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prohibition against discrimination enshrined in Article 2(2) of the 
Covenant is subject to neither progressive realization nor the 
availability of resources; it applies fully and immediately to all 
aspects of the protection of the right and encompasses all 
internationally prohibited grounds of discrimination.433 
 
CESCR has made clear that State parties have a core obligation to 
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels 
of each of the rights enunciated in the Covenant for everyone within 
its jurisdiction.434 In terms of Thailand’s positive core obligations, at 
least the following rights for refugees and asylum seekers living 
within its borders must be protected: 
 Access in the camps to the minimum essential food that 
is nutritionally adequate, safe, and ensures freedom from 
hunger 
 Access in the camps to basic shelter, housing, sanitation, 
and an adequate supply of safe and potable water 
 Access for refugees to adequate health facilities, goods, 
and services 
 Access of refugees to appropriate educational facilities 
and educators—as well as free primary education435 
Furthermore, Thailand cannot argue that resource constraints make it 
impossible to provide access to food, shelter, health care, or 
educational services for those who are unable by themselves to secure 
such access without first demonstrating that every effort has been 
made to use all the resources at its disposal in an effort to satisfy, as a 
matter of priority, those minimum obligations.436 These core 
obligations are non-derogable—especially the right to adequate 
                                                                                                             
433. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, The Right to Education, Gen. 
Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 43-45. 
434.  Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Nature of States Parties’ 
Obligations, Gen. Comment 3, supra note 422, ¶ 10; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 
43 (citing International Conference on Population and Development, Report, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, Ch. I, Resol. 1 (Sept. 5-13, 1994)) (“Read in conjunction with more 
contemporary instruments, such as the Programme of Action of the International Conference 
on Population and Development, the Alma-Ata Declaration provides compelling guidance on 
the core obligations arising from article 12.”). 
435. See supra note 344. 
436. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen. 
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 17. 
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food.437 Furthermore, CESCR’s interpretation of the Covenant 
includes a strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in 
relation to these rights are not permissible.438 While Thailand never 
itself funded the supply of food, goods, and services within these 
camps, with the decline in resource provision, Thailand has 
deliberately begun to enforce policies that cement refugees’ inability 
to secure appropriate resources to fulfill their rights. With the 
enactment of these deliberately retrogressive measures, Thailand has 
the burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most 
careful consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified 
by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant 
in the context of the full use of Thailand’s maximum available 
resources.439 Finally, per the prohibition contained in ICESCR Article 
2, any discrimination in access to food, shelter, health care, and 
educational services—as well as to means and entitlements for its 
procurement—on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, age, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status with the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the equal enjoyment or exercise of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, constitutes a violation of the Covenant.440 Thailand is 
clearly discriminating against this population due to their refugee 
status. While the Covenant provides for progressive realization and 
acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of available resources, 
it also imposes on State parties various obligations that are of 
immediate effect, in particular the prohibition against discrimination 
and the protection of vulnerable populations.441  
 
                                                                                                             
437. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 28 & 47. 
438. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 32 (referencing General Comment 3, 
¶ 9 and General Comment 13, ¶ 45). 
439. Id. 
440. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, Gen. 
Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶¶ 6, 18; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to 
Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 43-45; Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural 
Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 
368, ¶¶ 12, 18-19. 
441. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, 
Gen. Comment 3, supra note 422, ¶ 12. 
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D. National Strategy & International Cooperation 
A State should have a margin of discretion in designing its own 
strategy to assure the guarantee of these fundamental rights, but the 
Covenant clearly mandates that each State party “take whatever steps 
are necessary to ensure that these rights to food, shelter, health care, 
and education are protected.”442  This requires some adoption of a 
national strategy, based on human rights principles, and “the 
formulation of policies and corresponding benchmarks—including the 
identification of the resources available to meet the objectives and the 
most cost-effective way of using them.”443 The Committee 
specifically notes that appropriate institutional mechanisms should be 
devised to secure a representative process towards the formulation of 
a strategy which draws on all available relevant domestic expertise, 
sets out the responsibilities and time-frame for the implementation of 
the necessary measures, and addresses intersectionality with other 
rights protections.444 
This does not mean that it is up to the host state alone to fund or 
resource refugees in its jurisdiction. However, State parties must 
make efforts to facilitate the provision of resources through 
collaboration with other donor States, NGOs and civil society; even 
though it is States that are the legal parties to the Covenant, and are 
thus ultimately accountable for compliance with its provisions within 
their own jurisdiction, all members of society— including individuals, 
families, local communities, non-governmental organizations, as well 
as the private business sector and other donor States—can 
beneficially contribute to the process of the realization of the rights to 
adequate food and shelter, health care, and education. So, as the 
Committee notes, States “should provide an environment that 
facilitates implementation of services by these civil society actors.”445 
The Committee has also noted, in terms of the reciprocal 
obligation of donor countries, most of which do not bear the burden 
of hosting large numbers of the world’s refugees, that these “States 
parties should recognize the essential role of international cooperation 
                                                                                                             
442.  Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, The Right to Adequate Food, 
Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 21. 
443.  Id. 
444.  Id. ¶¶ 24-25; see also Comm. on Econ., Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 53. 
445.  Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, The Right to Adequate Food, 
Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 20. 
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and comply with their commitment to take joint and separate action to 
achieve the full realization of the right[s protected in the 
Covenant].”446 As a component of implementing this commitment, 
State parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of these 
protected rights in other countries, to protect those rights, to facilitate 
access to food, and to provide the necessary aid when required. The 
Committee emphasizes that “it is particularly incumbent on States 
parties and other actors in a position to assist, to provide ‘international 
assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical’ which 
enable developing countries to fulfill their core and other 
obligations.”447 
States also have a joint and individual responsibility, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to cooperate in 
providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of 
emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced 
persons.448 Priority in the provision of international medical aid, 
distribution and management of resources, such as safe and potable 
water, food, and medical supplies, and financial aid should be given 
to the most vulnerable or marginalized groups of the population.”449 
 
In contrast, Thailand has not articulated any national strategy to 
secure these rights for the refugees living within its border, nor, as is 
required by the Covenant, has Thailand attempted to provide an 
environment that facilitates implementation of services by other State 
                                                                                                             
446.  Id. ¶ 36 (“In the spirit of Article 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
specific provisions contained in articles 11, 2.1, and 23 of the Covenant and the Rome 
Declaration of the World Food Summit.”); see also Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., 
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, 
¶ 53 (citing Article II, Alma-Ata Declaration, Report of the International Conference on 
Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, 6-12 September 1978, in: World Health Organization, 
“Health for All” Series, No. 1, WHO, Geneva, 1978); Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural 
Rts., The Right to Education, Gen. Comment 13, supra note 387, ¶¶ 43-45 (“[T]he right to 
education 28 Articles 2 (1) and 23 of the Covenant, Article 56 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, Article 10 of the World Declaration on Education for All, and Part I, paragraph 34 of 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action all reinforce the obligation of States parties 
in relation to the provision of international assistance and cooperation for the full realization of 
the right to education.”).  
447.  Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 45. 
448.  Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, 
Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 38. 
449.  Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, Gen. Comment 14, supra note 368, ¶ 40. 
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parties or by civil society actors.450 Although Thailand is ultimately 
accountable for the protection of ICESCR rights within its 
jurisdiction, it is important to note here to recognize that the burden of 
humanitarian assistance should lie not just with Thailand, but with all 
other ICESCR State parties as well. For Thailand to meet its 
obligations under international law regarding the provision of food, 
shelter, health care, and education for refugees, other State parties 
have an obligation and responsibility to provide support, funding, 
resources, and services.451 However, it also incumbent upon Thailand 
to solicit support from donor States and civil society to ensure 
protection of basic rights if Thailand is unable to do so using its own 
available resources.  Ultimately, as a State party, the obligation of 
protecting ICESCR rights within the jurisdiction attaches, not to 
donor States, but to Thailand itself. 
 
3. Application of Rights to Adequate Standard of Living (Food & 
Shelter), Health Care, & Education to Non-Nationals 
 
ICESCR Article 2(1) states that all State parties must take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, by 
all appropriate means and to the maximum of its available resources, 
to progressively realize the rights in the Covenant.452 The second 
paragraph of Article 2 then stipulates that States parties must 
guarantee those rights will be exercised without discrimination of any 
kind as to a number of enumerated categories including race, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
or other status.453 However, the third paragraph of Article 3 does 
allow for one small carve out: “Developing countries, with due regard 
to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what 
extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the 
present Covenant to non-nationals.”454 
Article 2, paragraph 3, only applies to the economic rights in the 
Covenant, and not to social and cultural rights. While there is some 
                                                                                                             
450. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Adequate Food, 
Gen. Comment 12, supra note 341, ¶ 20. 
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452. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 2, ¶1. 
453. Id. at art. 2, ¶2. 
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question as to what actually differentiates a given right in the 
Covenant as exclusively economic, social, or cultural, it appears from 
the travaux préparatoires at the time of drafting paragraph 3, that 
economic rights refers to specifically employment-related rights.455 In 
fact, according to some scholars, the scope is even more limited, 
given the actual origins and meaning of Article 2, paragraph 3. 
According to the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
ICESCR,456 “[a]s a general rule the Covenant applies equally to 
nationals and non-nationals,” and the original purpose of article 2(3) 
was actually only “to end the domination of certain economic groups 
of non-nationals during colonial times.”457  
Another set of independent scholars, expounding on this, state:  
Paragraph 3 was not included in the original text of Article 2 
which was proposed by the Commission on Human Rights. 
Amendments to introduce the provision were first suggested by 
Indonesia and Burma. The purpose of doing so, according to the 
travaux préparatoires, was to allow former colonies which had 
recently gained independence, and whose economies were 
consequently dominated by the influence of non-nationals, to 
protect the position of their nationals. The intentions of those 
proposing the introduction of Article 2(3) is clear from their 
response to concerns that the provision would ‘give rise to all 
kinds of discrimination alien to the intentions of the sponsors’…. 
                                                                                                             
455. See Ben Saul, David Kinley, & Jacqueline Mowbray, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS, pp. 214-215, (May 2014) (citing UNGA, Third Committee, A/5365 (17 
December 1962), 21 & UNGA, Third Committee, A/5365 (17 December 1962), 20–21 (“The 
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General Comment No. 11, Plans of action for primary education (Art. 14), E/C.12/1994/4 (10 
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States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The 
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Limburg Principles, a similar group of experts agreed on the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
457. The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶¶42-44, UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex; and Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1987), pp. 122–135.  
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Far from opening the door to discrimination, the amendments 
were designed to restore the proper balance by enabling nationals 
to exercise their rights. In the developed countries which had not 
been subjected to colonial domination, on the other hand, 
immigration had always been controlled by the Government and 
non-nationals did not, as a rule, offer serious competition to the 
economic activities of nationals.458 
A strong argument can be made, given this origin, that the exception 
in article 2(3) should be interpreted very narrowly.459 
In its own interpretation of the intersection of these paragraphs 
within ICESCR Article 2, the ICESCR Committee specifically stated 
in its General Comment 20, “The ground of nationality should not bar 
access to Covenant rights, e.g. all children within a State, including 
those with an undocumented status, have a right to receive education 
and access to adequate food and affordable health care. The Covenant 
rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, 
asylum-seekers, stateless persons, [and] migrant workers…,regardless 
of legal status and documentation.”460 Within this statement, the 
Committee includes two footnotes. The first footnote concedes that 
the statement is “without prejudice to the application of art. 2, para. 3, 
of the Covenant.”461 The second footnote points, for further 
clarification, to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination’s General Recommendation 30 on 
discrimination against non-citizens.462 In CERD, another treaty to 
which Thailand is a State party, Article 5 protects against racial 
discrimination related to a number of rights including housing, health 
care, and education.463 CERD Article 1 stipulates that “the term 
‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
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460.  Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Non-discrimination in economic, social 
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social, cultural or any other field of public life.”464 The second 
paragraph of CERD Article 2 then clarifies, “This Convention shall 
not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made 
by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-
citizens.”465 However, the CERD Committee, in its General 
Recommendation 30 to which the ICESCR Committee points, notes 
that “although some of these rights, such as the right to participate in 
elections, to vote and to stand for election, may be confined to 
citizens, human rights are, in principle, to be enjoyed by all 
persons.”466 The CERD Committee further clarifies that “States 
parties are under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens 
and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the extent 
recognized under international law.”467 The CERD Committee then 
notes that State parties should “[r]remove obstacles that prevent the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by non-citizens, 
notably in the areas of education, housing, employment and 
health.”468 Specifically, the Committee guides States to ensure that the 
right to housing is enjoyed equally by citizens and non-citizens; that 
non-citizens have access to an adequate standard of physical and 
mental health; that public educational institutions are open to non-
citizens and children of undocumented immigrants; and that housing, 
health services, and schooling in general are not segregated.469 Similar 
provisions also exist in CEDAW and CRC—also treaties to which 
Thailand is a State party, protecting individuals from nationality-
based discrimination related to fundamental economic, social, and 
cultural rights.470  
The Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking 
water and sanitation, in her report on Thailand, also found that, at a 
minimum, the nationality status cannot be used as a pretext to deny 
basic rights to refugees living in Thailand. In her report, she stated: 
The marginalized people that the Special Rapporteur met during 
her mission represent a significant number of people living in 
Thailand. Every individual, regardless of national origin, race, 
                                                                                                             
464. Id. at art. 1(1). 
465. Id., at art. 1(2). 
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language and status, is equally entitled to the human rights to 
water and sanitation. The Committee on the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights noted that: 'The ground of nationality should 
not bar access to Covenant rights… The Covenant rights apply to 
everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum-
seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of 
international trafficking, regardless of legal status and 
documentation.’ People’s status cannot be used as a pretext to 
deny them access to water and sanitation.  
In particular, as discussed in Sections III.a.2.A-D, especially 
vulnerable populations such as refugees and those fleeing disasters 
are due protections and must be assured access to the means and 
resources necessary to secure their fundamental rights. 
In sum, the carve out in ICESCR Article 2, paragraph 3, should 
be treated as a very narrow construction. At most, it should be read to 
affect exclusively employment related economic rights—and even 
these limitations should be subject to further narrowing, an issue to be 
discussed in greater detail in the Right to Work section below. Thus, 
the rights to food, shelter, health care, and education would remain 
outside the carve out of paragraph 3. Furthermore, in addition to the 
protections provided under ICESCR, several other core human rights 
treaties to which Thailand is a State party also protect these rights and 
do not allow discrimination in these areas based on nationality.471 
Various Committees have pointed out that vulnerable refugees are 
due protections to ensure their rights are secured. Given these various 
treaty obligations, Thailand is required to protect the rights to food, 
shelter, health care, and education equally for non-nationals residing 
in their jurisdiction. 
 
b. Freedom of Movement 
1. Characterization of Right to Freedom of Movement 
Just as many socio-economic rights are protected through 
ICESCR, other civil and political rights are protected through another 
key convention to which Thailand is a State party: the International 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).472 Specifically, 
freedom of movement is protected under ICCPR Article 12, which 
mandates: 
Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that 
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose his residence. . . . [This right] shall not be subject to any 
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are 
necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and 
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present 
Covenant . . . .473 
The ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee, in its General Comment 27 
addressing freedom of movement, notes that “[l]iberty of movement 
is an indispensable condition for the free development of a person.”474 
Freedom of movement guarantees that a person is able to move 
throughout the jurisdiction. Allowing movement, but only within a 
designated area, or allowing movement into other areas, but only with 
government permission, does not meet the necessary threshold for the 
protection of this right.475 This freedom pertains not just to temporary 
movement, but also to the choice of one’s residence.476 For example, 
without a reason for allowable derogation, forcibly restricting areas of 
settlement would constitute a violation.477 
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in a defined part of the territory. Lawful detention, however, affects more specifically the right 
to personal liberty and is covered by article 9 of the Covenant. In some circumstances, articles 
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As protected under Article 12 of the ICCPR, Thailand is 
required to protect the right of everyone lawfully within its 
jurisdiction to liberty of movement and freedom to choose one’s 
residence.478 Any restriction by Thailand of this fundamental right 
must be explicitly provided for in law and must be necessary to 
protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others.479 
Only allowing refugee movement within a designated area, or 
allowing movement into other areas only with government 
permission, does not meet the necessary threshold for the protection 
of this right.480 This freedom also pertains not just to temporary 
movement, but also to the choice of one’s residence.481 Forcibly 
restricting areas of settlement also constitutes a violation.482 Thailand 
is violating these refugees’ rights to freedom of movement by forcing 
                                                                                                             
12 and 9 may come into play together."); id. ¶ 17 ("A major source of concern are the manifold 
legal and bureaucratic barriers unnecessarily affecting the full enjoyment of the rights of the 
individuals to move freely, to leave a country, including their own, and to take up residence. 
Regarding the right to movement within a country, the Committee has criticized provisions 
requiring individuals to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval 
of the local authorities of the place of destination, as well as delays in processing such written 
applications."). 
478.  ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12.   
479.  Id.   
480.  Id. ¶ 5 (“The right to move freely relates to the whole territory of a State, including 
all parts of federal States. According to article 12, paragraph 1, persons are entitled to move 
from one place to another, and to establish themselves in a place of their choice. The 
enjoyment of this right must not be made dependent on any particular purpose or reason for the 
person wanting to move or to stay in a place. Any restrictions must be in conformity with 
paragraph 3.”). 
481. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12 
482. Citing, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra 
note 474, ¶ 7 (Communication No. 138/1983, Mpandajila v. Zaire, ¶ 10; Communication No. 
157/1983, Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire, ¶ 10; Communication Nos. 241 and 242/1987, 
Birhashwirwa/Tshisekedi v. Zaire, ¶ 13) ("Subject to the provisions of article 12, paragraph 3, 
the right to reside in a place of one's choice within the territory includes protection against all 
forms of forced internal displacement. It also precludes preventing the entry or stay of persons 
in a defined part of the territory. Lawful detention, however, affects more specifically the right 
to personal liberty and is covered by article 9 of the Covenant. In some circumstances, articles 
12 and 9 may come into play together."); id. ¶ 17 ("A major source of concern are the manifold 
legal and bureaucratic barriers unnecessarily affecting the full enjoyment of the rights of the 
individuals to move freely, to leave a country, including their own, and to take up residence. 
Regarding the right to movement within a country, the Committee has criticized provisions 
requiring individuals to apply for permission to change their residence or to seek the approval 
of the local authorities of the place of destination, as well as delays in processing such written 
applications."). 
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them to reside within closed camps and not allowing free entry and 
egress from camp boundaries. 
2. ICCPR Framework Underpinning Right to Freedom of Movement 
There are some limited allowable derogations from the 
protection of freedom of movement.483 First, any derogation must be 
detailed in writing in domestic law—and the law must also clearly 
outline the conditions under which the right may be limited.484 
Second, the right can only be derogated for one of the specific, 
enumerated, and exhaustive reasons: national security; public order; 
public health or morals; or to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.485 
Finally, the permissible limitations that may be imposed on the 
rights protected under Article 12 must be narrowly tailored—meaning 
they “must not nullify the principle of liberty of movement, and are 
governed by the requirement of necessity provided for in Article 12, 
paragraph 3, and by the need for consistency with the other rights 
recognized in the Covenant.”486 In other words, as the Committee 
notes:  
In adopting laws providing for restrictions permitted by article 
12, paragraph 3, States should always be guided by the principle 
that the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right (cf. 
art 5, para. 1); the relation between right and restriction, between 
norm and exception, must not be reversed. The laws authorizing 
the application of restrictions should use precise criteria and may 
not confer unfettered discretion on those charged with their 
execution. 
Article 12, paragraph 3, clearly indicates that it is not sufficient that 
the restrictions serve the permissible purposes; they must also be 
necessary to protect them. Restrictive measures must conform to the 
principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their 
protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument 
amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must 
be proportionate to the interest to be protected. The Committee states, 
“[Finally, t]he principle of proportionality has to be respected not 
                                                                                                             
483. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 3. 
484. Id. ¶¶ 3, 12. 
485. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12 
486. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 2. 
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only in the law that frames the restrictions, but also by the 
administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law.”487 In 
general, the application of any permissible restrictions must also be 
consistent with the other rights guaranteed in the Covenant and with 
the fundamental principles of equality and non-discrimination; thus, it 
would be a clear violation of the Covenant if the rights enshrined 
under Article 12 were restricted by making distinctions of any kind, 
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.488 
Even when derogations could be justified under certain 
circumstances, the Committee requires the parameters of these 
derogations to be outlined in national reports to the Human Rights 
Committee during the ICCPR periodic review process.489 The 
Committee stipulates:  
States parties should provide the Committee in their reports with 
the relevant domestic legal rules and administrative and judicial 
practices relating to the rights protected by this article, taking 
into account the issues discussed in this General Comment. They 
must also include information on remedies available if these 
rights are restricted.490 
 
In terms of limited allowable derogations, these are only 
permissible in extremely limited circumstances.491 First, any 
derogation must be detailed in writing in domestic law—and the law 
must also clearly outline the conditions under which the right may be 
limited.492 No legislation in Thailand exists that limits the residence 
and movements of refugees or asylum seekers. Thai authorities have 
claimed that a policy has always existed that limits the movement of 
refugees in the nine camps; however, no such written policy is 
available either to the public or to refugees.493  
Second, the right can only be derogated for one of the specific, 
enumerated, and exhaustive reasons: national security; public order; 
public health or morals; or to protect the rights and freedoms of 
                                                                                                             
487. Id.  ¶¶ 13-15. 
488. Id. ¶ 18.  
489. Id. ¶ 3. 
490.  Id.   
491. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 3. 
492. Id. ¶¶ 3, 12. 
493. See supra, note 285. 
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others.494 Thailand has offered no such rationale for restricting the 
freedom of movement of refugees. While it is unclear how any of 
these reasons could be applicable in this case, even if Thailand was to 
try and offer one as justification for camp closures, the Committee 
would also require that the limitation imposed on the right to freedom 
of movement be necessary and narrowly tailored.495 The Committee 
explains that any law authorizing the application of restrictions must 
use precise criteria and may not confer unfettered discretion on those 
charged with their execution.496 Restrictive measures must conform to 
the principle of proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve 
their protective function; they must be the least intrusive instrument 
amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must 
be proportionate to the interest to be protected.497 Thailand has no 
written law, let alone a law that details any reasoning (necessary or 
otherwise) for a restriction of movement; a process to evaluate and 
limit which refugees should be included in the restriction; or a process 
by which the effects of this restriction could be best curtailed. Finally, 
it is clear that these restrictions as they stand are based solely on the 
affected individuals’ national or social origin, race, or political or 
other opinion—discriminatory restrictions all obvious violations of 
Article 12.498 
 
3. Application of Right to Freedom of Movement to Non-Nationals     
Each State party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to “all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”499 In 
general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone, 
irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or 
statelessness.500 Subsequently, freedom of movement is a right 
guaranteed by the Convention to both nationals and non-nationals 
who are legally within the territory of the State. As the Committee 
says, “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State enjoys, within 
                                                                                                             
494. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 12 
495. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 2. 
496. Id. 
497. Id.  
498. Id. ¶ 18.  
499. ICCPR, supra note 472, art. 2(1). 
500. Hum. Rts. Comm., The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, ¶ 1, Gen. Comment 
15, U.N. Doc. HRI/Gen/1/Rev.9 (April 11, 1986). 
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that territory, the right to move freely and to choose his or her place 
of residence.”501  
The legality of a non-national’s presence is determined by the 
State’s domestic law.502 While a State can subject entry of non-
nationals to certain restrictions, these restrictions must be in 
compliance with the State’s treaty and other obligations under 
customary international law.503 Furthermore, even a non-national who 
enters the State illegally, but whose status is then subsequently 
regularized by the State, would be deemed under the ICCPR to be 
lawfully within the jurisdiction.504 As the Committee notes:  
Once a person is lawfully within a State, any restrictions on his 
or her rights . . . , as well as any treatment different from that 
accorded to nationals, have to be justified under the rules [i.e., 
allowable derogations] provided for by article 12, paragraph 3.505 
The general rule is that all rights in the ICCPR must be guaranteed 
without discrimination between citizens and aliens.506 This pertains to 
both legislation and implementation and practice.507 While the ICCPR 
does not recognize the right of someone who is a non-national to 
move to or enter that State, and/or initial consent for entry in some 
cases may be given subject to conditions relating, for example, to 
employment, once that alien has entered the State, the ICCPR 
                                                                                                             
501.  Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 
4 (citing Communication No. 456/1991, Celepli vs. Sweden, ¶ 9.2; citing also General 
Comment No. 15, ¶ 8, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 3, 15 August 1997, 20). 
502.  Id. 
503. Id. at ¶4 & 11-18,  
504.  Id. at ¶4 
505.  Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 
4 (citing Communication No. 456/1991, Celepli vs. Sweden, ¶ 9.2; citing also General 
Comment No. 15, ¶ 8, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 3, 15 August 1997, 20). In principle, citizens of a 
State are always lawfully within the territory of that State. The question whether an alien is 
“lawfully” within the territory of a State is a matter governed by domestic law, which may 
subject the entry of an alien to the territory of a State to restrictions, provided they are in 
compliance with the State’s international obligations. In that connection, the Committee has 
held that an alien who entered the State illegally, but whose status has been regularized, must 
be considered to be lawfully within the territory for the purposes of Article 12. Once a person 
is lawfully within a State, any restrictions on his or her rights guaranteed by Article 12, 
paragraphs 1 and 2, as well as any treatment different from that accorded to nationals, have to 
be justified under the rules provided for by Article 12, paragraph 3. It is, therefore, important 
that States parties indicate in their reports the circumstances in which they treat aliens 
differently from their nationals in this regard, and how they justify this difference in treatment. 
506.  Hum. Rts. Comm., The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, Gen. Comment 15, 
supra note 500, ¶ 2. 
507. Id.  ¶ 4. 
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guarantees that they are entitled to all of the rights in the 
convention.508 The Committee has noted, for example, that aliens 
have an inherent right to life, protected by law, and may not be 
arbitrarily deprived of life; they must not be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may they 
be held in slavery or servitude; they have the full right to liberty and 
security of the person; if lawfully deprived of their liberty, they shall 
be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of 
their person; they may not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence; they 
have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and the 
right to hold opinions and to express them; they receive the benefit of 
the right of peaceful assembly and of freedom of association; they are 
entitled to equal protection by the law; and, of course, they have the 
right to liberty of movement and free choice of residence.509 There 
can be no discrimination between aliens and citizens in the 
application of these rights, and these rights may be qualified only by 
such limitations as may be lawfully imposed under the Covenant.510 
 
Freedom of movement is a right guaranteed by the Convention 
to both nationals and non-nationals who are legally within the 
territory of the State.511 As the Committee has stated, even a non-
national who enters the State illegally, but whose status is then 
subsequently regularized by the State, would be deemed under the 
ICCPR to be lawfully within the jurisdiction.512 Camp residents are 
asylum seekers seeking refugee status—and thus are legally within 
Thailand’s jurisdiction. Thailand cannot deny the legality of their 
presence simply by discontinuing refugee status determination 
processes. 
                                                                                                             
508. Id.  ¶¶ 5-6. 
509. Id.  ¶ 7. 
510. Id.  
511. Hum. Rts. Comm., Freedom of Movement, Gen. Comment 27, supra note 474, ¶ 
4 (citing Communication No. 456/1991, Celepli vs. Sweden, ¶ 9.2; citing also General 
Comment No. 15, ¶ 8, in HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 3, 15 August 1997, 20). 
512. See id. at ¶ 4.  
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c. Right to Work 
1. Characterization of Right to Work 
Like the rights to food, shelter, health care, and education, the 
right to work is also protected through the ICESCR—specifically 
under ICESCR Article 6, which mandates: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to 
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to 
gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and 
will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right . . . .513 
As the ICESCR Committee states in General Comment 27: 
The right to work is a fundamental right, recognized in several 
international legal instruments. The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as laid down in 
article 6, deals more comprehensively than any other instrument 
with this right. The right to work is essential for realizing other 
human rights and forms an inseparable and inherent part of 
human dignity. Every individual has the right to be able to work, 
allowing him/her to live in dignity. The right to work contributes 
at the same time to the survival of the individual and to that of 
his/her family, and insofar as work is freely chosen or accepted, 
to his/her development and recognition within the community.514 
                                                                                                             
513. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 6. 
514. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Work, ¶ 1, Gen. Comment 
18, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 (Feb. 6, 2006) (citing also preamble to ILO Convention No. 168, 
1988, “ . . . the importance of work and productive employment in any society not only 
because of the resources which they create for the community, but also because of the income 
which they bring to workers, the social role which they confer and the feeling of self-esteem 
which workers derive from them”); see also id. ¶ 3 (“[A]t the universal level, the right to work 
is contained in article 8, paragraph 3 (a), of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Civil Rights (ICCPR); in article 5, paragraph (e) (i), of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; in article 11, paragraph 1 (a), of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; in article 32 of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and in articles 11, 25, 26, 40, 52 and 54 of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families. Several regional instruments recognize the right to work in its general 
dimension, including the European Social Charter of 1961 and the Revised European Social 
Charter of 1996 (Part II, art. 1), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (art. 15) 
and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 6), and affirm the principle that respect for the right 
to work imposes on States parties an obligation to take measures aimed at the realization of 
full employment. Similarly, the right to work has been proclaimed by the United Nations 
General Assembly in the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, in its resolution 
2542 (XXIV) of 11 December 1969 (art. 6).”). 
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The right to work, as guaranteed in the ICESCR, affirms the 
obligation of State parties to assure individuals their right to freely 
chosen or accepted work, including the right not to be deprived of 
work unfairly.515 The Committee notes, “This definition underlines 
the fact that respect for the individual and his dignity is expressed 
through the freedom of the individual regarding the choice to work, 
while emphasizing the importance of work for personal development 
as well as for social and economic inclusion.”516 The right to work 
includes the right of every human being to decide freely to accept or 
choose work.517 This implies not only being forced to exercise or 
engage in employment, but also the right of access to a system of 
protection guaranteeing each worker access to employment.518 It also 
implies the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment.519 
 
Thailand is also required to protect refugees’ right to work under 
Article 6 of the ICESCR. The right to work, as guaranteed in the 
ICESCR, affirms the obligation of State parties to assure individuals 
their right to freely chosen or accepted work, including the right not 
to be deprived of work unfairly.520 The right to work includes the 
right of every human being to decide freely to accept or choose 
work.521 This implies not only being forced to exercise or engage in 
employment, but also the right of access to a system of protection 
guaranteeing each worker access to employment.522 It also implies the 
right not to be unfairly deprived of employment.523 By prohibiting 
refugees from leaving camp boundaries and not allowing them to 
secure gainful employment, Thailand violates this right to work. 
 
                                                                                                             
515. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Work, Gen. Comment 18, 
supra note 514, ¶ 4. 
516.  Id.  
517.  Id. ¶ 6. 
518.  Id.  
519.  Id.  
520. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., The Right to Work, Gen. Comment 18, 
supra note 514, ¶ 4. 
521. Id. ¶ 6. 
522. Id.  
523. Id.  
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2. ICESCR Framework Underpinning Right to Work 
The right to work is supported by the same ICESCR framework 
described in Section II.a.2. Like all human rights, the right to work 
imposes three types or levels of obligations on State parties: the 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill.524 The obligation to respect 
the right to work requires States parties to refrain from interfering 
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of that right.525 In particular, 
as the Committee states: 
States parties are under the obligation to respect the right to work 
by . . . refraining from denying or limiting equal access to decent 
work for all persons, especially disadvantaged and marginalized 
individuals and groups, including prisoners or detainees, 
members of minorities and migrant workers . . . .526 
Violations of this right can occur through acts of commission—the 
direct action of States or other entities insufficiently regulated by 
States—or by acts of omission—the failure of a State to take steps 
required by the Covenant.527 The Committee has cited several 
examples of these types of violations, including “the formal repeal or 
suspension of legislation necessary for continued enjoyment of the 
right to work; denial of access to work to particular individuals or 
groups, whether such discrimination is based on legislation or 
practice; and the adoption of legislation or policies which are 
manifestly incompatible with international obligations in relation to 
the right to work.”528 
As with other ICESCR rights to food, shelter, health care, and 
education discussed earlier, State parties have a core obligation to 
ensure the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights covered by the Covenant.529 In the context of Article 6, this 
“core obligation” encompasses the obligation to ensure non-
discrimination and equal protection of employment.530 States must 
ensure the right of access to employment, especially for 
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups, permitting 
                                                                                                             
524.  Id. ¶ 22. 
525.  Id.  
526.  Id. ¶ 23. 
527.  Id. ¶ 32. 
528.  Id.  
529.  Id. ¶ 31. 
530.  Id.  
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them to live a life of dignity.531 As the Committee notes, the exercise 
of work in all its forms and at all levels requires the existence of 
interdependent and essential elements, including accessibility—i.e., 
the labor market must be open to everyone under the jurisdiction of 
State parties.532 As stated previously, the Covenant prohibits any 
discrimination in access to and maintenance of employment on the 
grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, physical or mental 
disability, health status (including HIV/AIDS), sexual orientation, or 
civil, political, social, or other status, which has the intention or effect 
of impairing or nullifying exercise of the right to work on a basis of 
equality.533 The Committee notes: 
The principle of non-discrimination as set out in article 2.2 of the 
Covenant and in article 7 of the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families should apply in relation to employment 
opportunities for migrant workers and their families. In this 
regard the Committee underlines the need for national plans of 
action to be devised to respect and promote such principles by all 
appropriate measures, legislative or otherwise.534 
Per the terms of the Covenant, State parties must also ensure the 
progressive realization of the exercise of the right to work.535 The 
Committee points out that such retrogressive measures include 
“denial of access to employment to particular individuals or groups, 
whether such discrimination is based on legislation or practice, 
abrogation or suspension of the legislation necessary for the exercise 
of the right to work[,] or the adoption of laws or policies that are 
manifestly incompatible with international legal obligations relating 
to the right to work.”536 State parties must therefore adopt, as quickly 
as possible, measures aiming at achieving full employment.537 While 
the Covenant provides for progressive realization and acknowledges 
the constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes 
                                                                                                             
531.  Id.  
532.  Id. ¶ 12 (“Only some of these topics feature in articles 2.2 and 3 of the Covenant. 
The others have been inferred from the practice of the Committee or from legislation or 
judicial practice in a growing number of States parties.”). 
533.  Id.  
534.  Id. ¶ 18. 
535.  Id. ¶ 19. 
536.  Id. ¶ 34. 
537.  Id. ¶ 19. 
2017] CROWLEY REPORT 413 
on State parties various obligations that are of immediate effect.538 As 
the Committee describes:  
States parties have immediate obligations in relation to the right 
to work, such as the obligation to ‘guarantee’ that it will be 
exercised ‘without discrimination of any kind’ (art. 2, para. 2) 
and the obligation ‘to take steps’ (art. 2, para. 1) towards the full 
realization of article 6. Such steps must be deliberate, concrete 
and targeted towards the full realization of the right to work.539  
Furthermore, as with all other rights protected in the Covenant, 
retrogressive measures should not be taken in relation to the right to 
work.540 If any deliberately retrogressive steps are taken, State parties 
have the burden of proving that they have been introduced after 
consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified by 
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant in 
the context of the full use of the State parties’ maximum available 
resources.541 
 
Like other rights protected under ICESCR, the right to work 
imposes three types or levels of obligations on Thailand: the 
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill.542 These obligations require 
Thailand to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the 
enjoyment of the right to work.543 In particular, the Committee notes 
that State parties may not deny or limit equal access to decent work 
for all persons, especially disadvantaged and marginalized individuals 
and groups—groups such as refugees.544 Denial of access to work to 
particular individuals or groups, whether such discrimination is based 
on legislation or practice, is clearly a violation of this right.545 
As with other ICESCR rights to food, shelter, health care, and 
education discussed earlier, Thailand has a core obligation to ensure 
                                                                                                             
538.  Id.  
539. Id. ¶¶ 19-20 (“The fact that realization of the right to work is progressive and takes 
place over a period of time should not be interpreted as depriving States parties’ obligations of 
all meaningful content.
 
It means that States parties have a specific and continuing obligation 
“to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards the full realization of article 
6.”). 
540.  Id. ¶ 21. 
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542. Id. ¶ 22. 
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the satisfaction of minimum essential levels to the right to work.546 In 
the context of Article 6, this “core obligation” encompasses the 
obligation to ensure non-discrimination and equal protection of 
employment.547 Per the terms of the Covenant, State parties must also 
ensure the progressive realization of the exercise of the right to 
work.548 The Committee points out that such retrogressive measures 
include “denial of access to employment to particular individuals or 
groups, whether such discrimination is based on legislation or 
practice, abrogation or suspension of the legislation necessary for the 
exercise of the right to work, or the adoption of laws or policies that 
are manifestly incompatible with international legal obligations 
relating to the right to work.”549 During some periods, Thailand has 
allowed refugees to leave the camps and secure gainful employment. 
Restricting this right now is a retrogressive measure tied to an 
impermissible distinction based on national or social origin, race, or 
political or other opinion.550 Even if this deliberately retrogressive 
step was not based on an impermissible distinction, Thailand would 
still have the burden of proving that these measure were introduced or 
enforced only after consideration of all other alternatives, and that the 
restrictions are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant in the context of the full use of the 
Thailand’s maximum available resources—none of which Thailand 
has done.551  
 
3. Application of Right to Work to Non-Nationals   
 
The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Optional Protocol 
directly and explicitly protects the rights of refugees to work.552 
Refugee Convention Article 17, paragraph 1, mandates that State 
                                                                                                             
546. Id. ¶ 31. 
547. Id.  
548. Id. ¶ 19. 
549. Id. ¶ 34. 
550. Id. ¶¶ 19-20 (“The fact that realization of the right to work is progressive and takes 
place over a period of time should not be interpreted as depriving States parties’ obligations of 
all meaningful content.
 
It means that States parties have a specific and continuing obligation 
“to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards the full realization of article 
6.”). 
551. Id.  
552. See Refugee Convention, supra note 332, at art. 17. 
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parties “accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most 
favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the 
same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage earning 
employment,” and Article 17, paragraph 2 clarifies that, “[i]n any 
case, restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of 
aliens for the protection of the national labour market shall not be 
applied to a refugee who…has completed three years’ residence in the 
country.”553 Thailand is not a party to the Refugee Convention, and is 
therefore not bound by its provisions, but this language is still 
important because it is indicative of the international standard 
regarding the right to work for refugees. Even though to date Thailand 
has not joined the Refugee Convention, Thailand is still bound by the 
other core human rights treaties to which it is a State party, several of 
which address the right to work.554  
As discussed previously in Section III.a.3, ICESCR Article 2(1) 
states that all State parties must take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, by all appropriate means 
and to the maximum of its available resources, to progressively 
realize the rights in the Covenant.555 The second paragraph of Article 
2 then stipulates that States parties must guarantee those rights will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to a number of 
enumerated categories including race, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, or other status.556 However, as 
noted earlier, the third paragraph of Article 3 does allow for one small 
carve out: “Developing countries, with due regard to human rights 
and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would 
guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to 
non-nationals.”557 
Again, from the travaux préparatoires at the time of drafting 
paragraph 3, it does seem that economic rights refers to the right to 
work, although according to some scholars, the scope might really 
only apply to states that are former colonies, recently having gained 
independence, and whose economies were consequently dominated 
by the influence of non-nationals—i.e., a provision designed to enable 
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554. ICESCR, supra note 335, art. 6; CERD, see supra note 336, at art. 5; and CEDAW, 
see supra note 337, at art. 11. 
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556. ICESCR, supra note 335, at art. 2, ¶2. 
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nationals to exercise their rights in limited circumstances where a 
national economy is dominated by non-nationals from the former 
colonial power.558 According to this perspective, this provision was 
never intended to apply generally to other developing countries that 
had not been subjected to colonial rule; the carve out would not be 
applicable in the context where immigration had always been 
controlled “by the Government[,] and non-nationals did not, as a rule, 
offer serious competition to the economic activities of nationals.”559 
While the ICESCR Committee does not address this issue 
directly, nor clarify specifically to which rights in the Covenant 
Article 2, paragraph 3, applies, the Committee does refer to the 
requirement that State parties ensure that vulnerable population such 
as refugees are able to access resources and services to secure their 
fundamental rights, and they do make reference in General Comment 
20 to this carve out as it applies to refugees. The Committee notes that 
in general the “Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-
nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, [and] 
migrant workers…,regardless of legal status and documentation,” and 
the Committee also comments that, specifically for some non-
employment related rights, “[t]he ground of nationality should not bar 
access to Covenant rights,”560 Again, within this statement, the 
Committee includes two footnotes. The first footnote concedes that 
the statement is “without prejudice to the application of art. 2, para. 3, 
of the Covenant.”561 The second footnote points, for further 
clarification, to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination’s General Recommendation 30 on 
discrimination against non-citizens.562 In CERD, Article 5 protects 
against racial discrimination related to a number of rights including 
the right to work.563 As discussed in Section III.a.3, the CERD 
Committee, found that while Article 1, paragraph 2, stipulates that 
“[CERD] shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or 
preferences made by a State Party…between citizens and non-
citizens,”564 and even though “some of these rights, such as the right 
                                                                                                             
558. See BEN SAUL, DAVID KINLEY, & JACQUELINE MOWBRAY, supra note 455.  
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560.  See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Non-discrimination in economic, 
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564. Id., at art. 1(2). 
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to participate in elections, to vote and to stand for election, may be 
confined to citizens,” it is still true that “human rights are, in 
principle, to be enjoyed by all persons.”565 The Committee further 
clarifies that “States parties are under an obligation to guarantee 
equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these 
rights to the extent recognized under international law.”566 
Specifically regarding the right to work, the CERD Committee, while 
recognizing that, while States parties may refuse to offer jobs to non-
citizens without a work permit, those individuals are still entitled to 
labor and employment rights, including the freedom of assembly and 
association.567 The Committee then also mandates that State parties 
“[t]ake measures to eliminate discrimination against non-citizens in 
relation to working conditions and work requirements, including 
employment rules and practices with discriminatory purposes or 
effects.”568 The Committee also recognizes that “in some cases denial 
of citizenship for long-term or permanent residents could result in 
creating disadvantage for them in access to employment and social 
benefits, in violation of the Convention’s anti-discrimination 
principles.”569 
 
 In sum, the Refugee Convention standard would suggest that, 
at a minimum, refugees living in Thailand for more than three years 
should be entitled to work.570 Although Thailand, not having joined 
the Refugee Convention, is not bound by this requirement, the other 
human rights conventions to which Thailand is a State party would 
create some obligations for Thailand regarding the right to work.571 In 
general, the rights protected in these conventions to which Thailand is 
a State party apply to everyone in Thailand, including refugees.572 
Thailand is also under an obligation to guarantee equality between 
citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of employment-related 
rights to the extent recognized under international law.573 Regarding 
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the right to work specifically, some limitations not applicable to 
citizens may be allowable in the short-term (e.g., initial work permits 
administered on a non-discriminatory basis).574 However, some of 
these refugees have been living in Thailand for many years—some for 
even thirty years or mores.575 Thailand cannot continue to block paths 
to citizenship, and/or refuse to continue refugee status determinations, 
and then use non-citizenship or undetermined legal status as a 
justification for continued violations of the right to work.576  
d. Coerced Returns & Principle of Non-Refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement is most clearly articulated in 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention: “No Contracting State shall 
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”577 While Thailand is not 
a State party to the Refugee Convention, this same non-refoulement 
language is echoed in several other treaties to which Thailand is a 
signatory, including the ICCPR, Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”), and Convention on Enforced Disappearances (“CED”).578 
Customary international law also binds states to the principle of non-
refoulement, demanding that, just as is stated in the Refugee 
Convention, refugees not be returned to their country of origin if there 
is a concern that their life or liberty would be at risk.579 During 
Thailand’s 2011 UPR cycle, more than one State party addressed 
Thailand’s duty to respect the customary international norm of non-
refoulement, in addition to the calls by several other State parties to 
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either recognize refugee rights in general, accede to the Refugee 
Convention, or both.580   
Thailand’s recent increased enforcement of restrictions on 
movement and work in the camps, coupled with decreases in essential 
resources and services, has placed refugees in a type of 
stranglehold—forcing them to choose between unacceptable and 
unsustainable living conditions in Thailand or to return back to 
Myanmar, where their life or liberty may be threatened. Despite 
Myanmar’s democratic transition, conditions in the country are 
unstable and not yet conducive for returns. Fighting between the 
Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups continues in many states.581 In 
Kayin State, from where the vast majority of Burmese refugees in 
Thailand originate, the Tatmadaw has been building new—and 
bolstering old—army bases and resupplying weapons, ammunition, 
and rations since the 2012 ceasefire agreement.582 Among refugees, 
these actions have led to a general distrust of the ceasefire.583 
Instances of arbitrary arrest, torture, sexual violence, forced labor, 
military conscriptions, and lack of access to legal due process have 
also been reported since the ceasefire went into effect.584 Moreover, 
development projects in Kayin, Kayah, and Mon States have led to 
land grabs, displacement without adequate compensation, and an 
increasing militarization throughout the region.585 There is a looming 
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threat of conflict, which could be exacerbated by an influx of 
returning refugees. Furthermore, landmines are scattered all over 
Kayin and Kayah States, posing significant threats to individuals’ 
physical security.586 
If refugees are coerced to return to Myanmar before conditions 
are safe, Thailand may have violated the principle of non-
refoulement.587 Even if some refugees may be able to return safely to 
Myamar, at least some other refugees would not be able to return 
safely to a location where their life or liberty would not be 
threatened.588 It is key to note that this status determination is an 
individuated process, and Thailand cannot claim that some amount of 
stabilization in Myanmar equates to a justification for wholesale 
removal of refugee status for all Burmese refugees living in the 
camps; in other words, Thailand must conduct an individual refugee 
status determination for each refugee to determine whether or not 
he/she could return without experiencing a threat to her/his life or 
liberty.589 
Furthermore, beyond direct refoulement, refugees are also 
protected from indirect refoulement: States cannot coerce refugees to 
return through a deprivation of basic needs.590 Although Thailand 
may not be physically returning refugees across the border, their 
failure to provide basic necessities, or the means to obtain them by 
restricting freedom of movement and right to work, would amount to 
indirect refoulement—which would be a violation under both 
Thailand’s treaty obligations and under accepted norms of customary 
international law.591 
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IV. CONCLUSION & KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Several fundamental human rights of Burmese refugees living in 
the nine border camps along the Thai-Burma border are being 
violated by Thailand, including the rights to an adequate standard of 
living (food and shelter), health care, and education; freedom of 
movement; and the right to work. The combination of these rights 
violations also threaten to constructively refoule these refugees in 
violation of Thailand’s obligations under several core international 
human rights treaties as well as principles of customary international 
law.  
Worsening conditions in Thai refugee camps are leading to 
violations of the interlocking rights to food, shelter, health care, and 
education, which are guaranteed by Articles 11, 12, and 13 of the 
ICESCR. Thailand’s obligations extend to everyone in its jurisdiction, 
and in particular, Thailand is required to ensure access to resources 
and services needed to secure these rights for especially vulnerable 
populations such as refugees. These obligations include providing 
safe and nutritious food in appropriate amounts, and yet the current 
ration amount refugees receive is far below international minimum 
nutritional standards. Refugees also have a right to adequate shelter, 
but Thailand not only does not supply materials for housing and 
repairs, but also prohibits refugees from building housing from 
durable and protective materials. Refugees have a right to health care, 
but decreased resources and services in refugee camps have created 
declining conditions in the quality and availability of skilled medical 
personnel and equipment, and Thailand has made no effort to 
implement alternative health facilities and services. Refugees are also 
                                                                                                             
the International Convention for Enforced Disappearances (“CED”). As a signatory, Thailand 
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experiencing violations of the right to education. Thailand does not 
provide educational services within the camps; as funding decreases 
for the NGOs that do provide services, Thailand must ensure that free 
primary education is provided, and that refugees maintain access to 
available and quality educational services. 
There are several components of the ICESCR framework that 
underpin these protections. Most importantly, these rights are 
afforded to everyone without discrimination of any kind as to race, 
color, sex, language, age, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status. They therefore protect 
not just Thai citizens, but also refugees and asylum seekers living in 
Thailand. Treaty provisions allowing developing countries to 
determine to what extent they would guarantee economic rights to 
non-nationals are inapplicable here because the rights to food, shelter, 
health care, and education are not economic, i.e., employment-related 
rights, in the meaning of ICESCR Article 2, paragraph 3. Thailand 
has an obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill these rights 
protections, and both its actions and inactions constitute violations of 
these rights. Thailand has a core, non-derogable obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each 
of the rights enunciated in the Covenant for everyone within its 
jurisdiction, and Thailand cannot argue that resource constraints make 
it impossible to provide access to food, shelter, health care, or 
educational services for those who are unable by themselves to secure 
such access without first demonstrating that every effort has been 
made to use all the resources at Thailand’s disposal in an effort to 
satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations. Nor are 
retrogressive measures taken in relation to these rights permissible; 
while Thailand never itself funded the supply of food, goods, and 
services within these camps, with the decline in resource provision, 
Thailand has deliberately begun to enforce policies that cement 
refugees’ inability to secure appropriate resources to fulfill their 
rights. With the enactment of these deliberately retrogressive 
measures, Thailand has the burden of proving that they have been 
introduced after the most careful consideration of all alternatives, and 
that they are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant in the context of the full use of 
Thailand’s maximum available resources. While Thailand is not 
expected to solely shoulder the responsibility for funding and 
resourcing this refugee population, Thailand is ultimately accountable 
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for the protection of ICESCR and other treaty rights within its 
jurisdiction; therefore, Thailand is required to request and facilitate 
cooperation of NGOs, civil society, businesses, and/or other State 
party donors to ensure that Thailand meets its treaty obligations. In 
turn, other State parties have an obligation and responsibility to 
provide support, funding, resources, and services. 
Under ICCPR Article 12, Thailand is also obligated to ensure the 
freedom of movement for refugees within its territory. Thailand’s 
strict confinement of refugees to camps contravenes the right to 
freedom of movement. Thailand’s unwritten policy to not allow 
refugees to leave camps is not recorded in law; neither is the policy 
available in written documentation to refugees or to the public. Aside 
from this, these blanket restrictions on movement are far too broad to 
meet any of the tests—proportionality, necessity, or most narrow 
tailoring—to be allowed as an acceptable derogation.  
Thailand is also obligated to guarantee the right to work under 
ICESCR Article 6, which recognizes the individual’s right to work 
and gain his living wage by work that he/she freely chooses. The 
scarcity of work within the camps means that any prohibition on 
leaving the camps is effectively a prohibition on work. Asylum 
seekers and refugees are not excluded from these protections; CESCR 
has stated that the ground of nationality should not bar access to 
rights, and that these rights apply to everyone including non-
nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, and 
migrant workers regardless of legal status and documentation. The 
Committee has also stated that State parties must ensure that 
vulnerable populations such as refugees are able to secure their rights. 
The Refugee Convention standard mandates that, at a minimum, 
refugees living in the host country for more than three years should be 
entitled to work. Although Thailand, not having joined the Refugee 
Convention, is not bound by this requirement, the other human rights 
conventions to which Thailand is a State party would create some 
obligations for Thailand regarding the right to work. For example, 
Thailand is under an obligation to guarantee equality between citizens 
and non-citizens in the enjoyment of employment-related rights to the 
extent recognized under international law. In light of ICESCR Article 
2, paragraph 3, some limitations not applicable to citizens may be 
allowable in the short-term for refugees (e.g., initial work permits 
administered on a non-discriminatory basis). However, Thailand 
cannot continue to block paths to citizenship, and/or refuse to 
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continue refugee status determinations, and then use non-citizenship 
or undetermined legal status as a justification for continued violations 
of the right to work. 
Not only is Thailand not meeting its minimum core requirements 
under ICESCR in terms of the rights to food, housing, healthcare, and 
education, but their policies restricting movement and work are 
actually exacerbating worsening conditions in the camps by 
eliminating potential income earning opportunities which could 
otherwise be used to supplement declining resources. These 
restrictions are especially egregious in light of the resulting further 
violations of the rights to an adequate standard of living—including 
food and housing, health care, and education. Thailand also has an 
obligation under various treaties to which Thailand is a State party—
including the ICCPR, CAT, and CED, as well under customary 
international law, to not return, or refoule, refugees to a location 
where there is a concern that their life or liberty would be at risk. 
Thailand’s recent increased enforcement of restrictions on movement 
and work in the camps, coupled with decreases in essential resources 
and services, has placed refugees in a type of stranglehold—forcing 
them to choose between unacceptable and unsustainable living 
conditions in Thailand or to return back to Myanmar, where their life 
or liberty may be threatened. Despite Myanmar’s democratic 
transition, conditions in the country are unstable and not yet 
conducive for returns. A large influx of retuning refugees might also 
exacerbate already unstable conditions, leading to even greater risk of 
violence or unsafe conditions. Even if some refugees may be able to 
return safely to Myanmar, at least some other refugees would not be 
able to do so. Thailand must conduct an individual refugee status 
determination for each refugee to determine whether or not he/she 
could return without experiencing a threat to her/his life or liberty. 
Refugees are also protected from indirect, or constructive, 
refoulement. Thailand cannot coerce refugees to return through a 
deprivation of basic needs. Although Thailand may not be physically 
returning refugees across the border, their failure to provide basic 
necessities, or the means to obtain them by restricting freedom of 
movement and right to work, would amount to indirect refoulement—
which would be a violation under both Thailand’s treaty obligations 
and under accepted norms of customary international law. 
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Accede without delay to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Optional Protocol. 
 Amend the Thai Immigration Act to establish a national 
asylum mechanism in line with international standards. 
 With the support of the international community, 
establish a mechanism and funding for the provision of 
resources and services to ensure refugees’ rights to food, 
shelter, health care, and education. 
 In keeping with Thailand’s international obligation to 
afford freedom of movement to all people lawfully 
within its borders, eliminate restrictions that prohibit 
Burmese refugees from transiting camp boundaries. 
 In keeping with Thailand’s international obligation to 
afford all people within its borders the opportunity to 
work, eliminate employment restrictions that prohibit 
Burmese refugees from gaining access to meaningful 
employment in Thailand. 
 To ensure refugee access to durable solutions, permit 
UNHCR entry to refugee camps to conduct 
individualized refugee status determinations and 
facilitate third country resettlement as appropriate. 
 Consult with refugee communities to address concerns 
of forcible repatriation while ensuring that all returns are 
voluntary and not coerced. 
 In accordance with treaty obligations and customary 
international law, ensure that all policies, laws, and 
government actions do not directly or indirectly violate 
the principle of non-refoulement. 
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